A Theoretical Study On The Effect Of Euity Incentive Of National Listed Companies

Today in the company, management has become a very important issue under discussion of the board and shareholders. Regardless of different political and economic systems, the incentive problems abound overwhelmingly. The only difference of the incentive lies in designing mechanisms and the implementation ways. So, as long as companies exist, principal-agent problem will emerge, incentive problems will happen therewith. The equity incentive has been the main way of incentive contract. An equity incentive is long-term incentive mechanism aiming to resolve principal-agent relationship between the shareholders and management in the modern firm institution. Around many developped capital markets,equity incentive has become one of the commonest company strategies from which most companies benefit a lot. With the rapid developpment of equity incentive behaviour during a few decades in last century,more and more companies in the world began to attach importance to such way to expect better relationship between shareholders and management.Like a double-edged sword, if the management are driven properly and fully, shareholders will get rich return by incentive contract and also bring management a large amount of wealth. However, the distorted design of incentives shall also let the company suffered many losses. In 2005, China's capital markets began a all-round reform of non-tradable shares to solve the inherent defects of the system, also known as shares split problems, making China's listed companies could implement equity incentives in its true sense. This paper starts from incentive theory, selects equity management incentive data from domestic listed companies and uses statistical analysis software such as EVIEWS, EXCEL to carry on empirical study on efficiency of China's equity incentive, influence factors and the impact of other issues. Finally we drew the conclusion and suggestion on incentive contract.