The Research On Principal-agent Relationship After Transferring The Operation Right Of Tourism Scenery Area

Since 1997, China's first practice of the management right transfer of the tourist attraction has been beginning, after more than ten years development, the management right transfer of the tourist attraction which is regarded as an innovation system has brought significant economic, social and environmental benefits in many regions and promoted the local tourist economy great-leap-forward development. With the increase in practice of transfer of the management right, the problem of transfer practice is gradually increasing, so we are ought to analyze and resolve these problems urgently from different point of view and different ways. This article uses the commission agent theory, and explores the transfer of the management right of the tourist attraction from the perspective of the commission agent relationship.Under the guidance of agent theory, this paper analyzes the agency by agreement relationship, explores the reasons that cause such kind of relationship, researches the characteristics and structure of that relationship and constructs the model of that relationship under asymmetric information. Through the analysis of the agency by agreement relationship of the management right transfer of the tourist attraction, the problems of the agency by agreement existing in the agency by agreement relationship has been clarified, the root of the problems has been analyzed and the solution for the problems has been proposed.The agency by agreement relationship after the management right transfer of the tourist attraction contains two kinds relationship, one is the relationship between the government and the citizens, and the other is the relationship between the government and tourism enterprises. The main characteristics of the agency relationship are: the client identity for the public performance is not clear, the government is in a key position, agency chain is long, and consignment risk and agency risk coexist. The commission issues and agency problems coexist in the agency relationship. The agency problems are mainly: the agent's behavior is lacking supervision, the agent's short-term behavior, rent seeking problem and internal control issues; commission problems are mainly: commission bias and task diversity, high costs of commission and the external control problems caused by ring upon ring commission. The root that causes these problems is the absence of the owner of the scenic spots and the responsibility of the main subject of the responsibilities is not clear. Therefore, it can effectively solve problems of the commission and agent of the scenic area management rights transfer by clarifying property rights of the tourism resources, identifying the main responsibilities of the principals, and consummating incentive and restrictive mechanism for the agent and consigner.