Theanalysis Of Driver’s Behavior In The Intersection Based On The Game

With the rapid development of social economy, increase of national income day byday and gradually rising of the motor vehicle, the global traffic problem has beengetting much more serious, traffic safety problem has become hot study topic for manyexperts and scholars, especially the research on the driver, one of the main subjects ofsocial activity has been widely concerned. People try to study the behavior of thedriver’s decision to relieve traffic pressure, improve the efficiency of road traffic, reducetraffic accidents and improve overall traffic safety. Such as using the following theoryand gap interspersed theory to study the driver’s decision-making behavior in theintersection, which could relieve the traffic pressure and reduce the number of trafficaccidents in the intersection very well. However, few experts and scholars combine thegame theory with the driver’s physical and psychological characteristics to study thedriver’s decision-making behavior in the intersection. So, in this thesis, the driver’sdecision-making behavior in the intersection was studied based on reduplicate game,and the utility function model of the driver behavior under a reduplicate game was built,the corresponding algorithm was given, at the same time, the practicability of utilityfunction models were verified through examples.The main work of the thesis is as follows:In the first chapter, the research background of the traffic game model and thedriver’s decision-making behavior model based on the game in the intersection wasintroduced. Research status at home and abroad of the driver’s decision-makingbehavior model in the intersection were also discussed. In addition, the main researchwork of the paper was introduced.In the second chapter, definitions of the reduplicate game、strict bad strategy andNash equilibrium, as well as knowledge of the gap interspersed theory were introduced,which lay a foundation for theoretical research and practical application in subsequentchapters.In the third chapter, according to the game theory, the driver’s personality factorsand the relative potential factors in the different strategies, which affect the driver tomake decisions, the utility function of the driver’s behaviors based on the dynamicreduplicate game theory was built up from the view of game theory. Analyzing the different combination of the utility of the driver’s decision-making behavior, Nashequilibrium was existed in a single game process, and the driver’s optimal decisionbehaviors in a dynamic game was obtained. Meanwhile, the practicability of the modelwas proved by an example. The example shows that impulse drivers are more willing tochoose to accelerate the first strategy in the decision-making period of time; milddrivers prefer to choose accelerate the preemptive strategy or maintain uniform strategy;cautious drivers prefer to choose to maintain uniform strategy or deceleration comitystrategy.In the fourth chapter, according to the game theory, the driver’s personality and thetime difference between non-motor vehicles and motor vehicles in each period, whichwill influence the driver’s decision-making behaviors, the utility function model of thenon-motor vehicles and motor vehicles driving behaviors based on the dynamicreduplicate game theory was built up. According to the utility of non-motor vehicles andmotor vehicle driver’s decision-making behavior, the optimal decision behaviors ofnon-motor vehicles and motor vehicles in a dynamic game were obtained. Meanwhile,the practicability of the model was proved by an example. The example shows thatdifferent personality drivers will make different drive decisions in each short period oftime and the model can reflect driver’s decision-making behaviors with differentpersonalities, when they cross the non-signalized intersection.In the last chapter, the summary and inadequacies work of the paper were given.Meanwhile, problems for further study were put forward.