The Research On The Incentive Mechanism Of Venture Entrepreneur

Venture investment is a kind of typical opinion investment, which is based on high-tech and knowledge, investing fund into the high risk industry. There is a kind of typical principal-agent relationship between the venture capitalists and the venture entrepreneurs. Because of the information asymmetry, the moral hazard will happen during the operation curse of venture investment. Therefore, the study on how to control the agent risk, and how to build up the reasonable incentive and restriction mechanism, has become more and more important study field of venture investment.The main content of this text is roughly divided into three major parts. At first, this thesis analyzes the morals risk problem that risk enterprises may take place, proceeding from information economics, with the principal-agent theory, which considers the morals risk is the main reason that the venture capitalists stimulate the risk entrepreneur. Secondly, the research focal point of this thesis is to set up the incentive mechanism of taking precautions against the morals risk, which includes: stage financing, designing rational incentive compensation agreement, employing material object option, and so on. At last this thesis has carried on detailed analysis in stage financing, designing compensation agreement and employing stock option, and carried on quantitative research by setting up mathematics model, the research of which show the regular income can not stimulate the risk entrepreneur, but the variable income is the most effective incentive means.The main conclusions of research of this text includes: (1)Morals risk is the basic reason of making incentive mechanism, and to structure and design the reasonable investment agreement is the best way of controlling moral venture ; (2)Stage financing is the effective control and incentive way in venture investment; (3) The regular income is not the reason why encouraging the risk entrepreneur to work hard, but the variable income is the effectivemeans of encouraging the risk entrepreneur to work hard, at the same time risk investor's value-added service and supervision work to the risk entrepreneur are the reasons of encouraging the risk entrepreneur to work hard either; (4) the risk entrepreneur is influenced by the venture capitalist's work and capability when he decides his actions in order to maximize his benefit; (5) The core of making agreement variable payment is the design of proportion of income for the risk entrepreneur, but not the design of the regular income. Variable income is not only connected with venture entrepreneur's capability, but the venture capitalist's ones and the comprehensive venture of venture firms.This paper analyzes the mechanism of motivation, and provides the models of the incentive mechanism, which builds up the foundation for establishing the reasonable compensation contracts in venture investment.