A Study On Principal-agent Relations In Reforming Systems Of The State-owned Enterprises

From 1980s', by being authorized or being parceled management, Chinese stated-owned enterprises have been changed from Product-type to Management-type. Now the basic reform aim has been achieved. On the other hand, because of the more and more authorities, the problems of agency-expense wan come in sight at the same time. The moral risk behavior of stated-owned enterprises' managers has been transited from professional doleful attitude to robbing national common wealth. Therefore, the present main reform destination is that reform of national resources management regime and reform of communal corporations synchronously carried through. Imperiously, the power of national resources management must be raised and the agency-expense must be abased.Principal-agency theory is the core contents of Information Economics. In circumstance of asymmetric information, because of agents' information advantages, reversed choices are come into being while treaty relationship formatted. From the start of treaty relationship, moral risks are built by hiding behavior and making beneficial decision to agents themselves. By Spence symbol transmission, Princepal-agency theory analyses the choice mechanism to agents. The high ability agent can distinguished themselves from those of low ability, by sending different expense symbols. Therefore the reversed choices can be improved. To the problem of moral risks, by way of Homostrom model, Consignment-agency theory analyses the risk distribution of consignment-agent. And the theory also demonstrates that agents must divide partial risks , suitably disburses agents according to corporation management. So effectiveness of corporation must be connected to agents' object function.In order to analysis the Principal-agency relationship of Chinese national corporations, the study expounded the type of shareholder formation—Principal agency structure—agency expense analysis. To reform progress of communal corporations, crucial reasons were that the change of agency expense was brought on by improvement of principal-agency structure. Based on planning-economy, Chinese stated-owned enterprises were rebuilt. In condition of communal corporations, the structure of national stocks was decisive and in stage of monopoly. So shareholder conference was actuallybecome the national shareholder conference or the directory enlarged conference by control of national stockholders. Little stockholders had seldom speaking chance and they were impossible to conserve their rights. On the other hand, the national stockholders were distributed in different departments. So inefficient princapil— agency mechanism was brought on. Now, national stockholder structure was changed deeply and many national funds were quit in competent fields. In condition of large national stockholder structure, national stockholders can give up partial decision rights by way of regime reform strategy. This can somewhat detract problems of owner-absence. The Princapal-agency relationship can be improved and the agency expense can be controlled efficiently.Ideally, MBO was the most efficient solution to problem of agency expense. But the operation was hot argued in Chinese state-owned enterprises. For example, such as buying price, important problems were not properly schemed. To the stock motivation plan, the operation progress was more efficient that corporation directory can connect manager income with corporation effectiveness by effective stocks and future stocks.Choice mechanism of entrepreneur was the core of Princaple-agency theory. The study illustrated the reasons of reversed choices formation by human price model. And the choice of entrepreneur was also analyzed by way of human regime reform.