Study On Motive And Characteristic Of Behaviors Of The Changed Largest Shareholder Of Listed Companies In China

At present, the changing of the Largest shareholder in listed companies is frequent, and the kinds of investors tend towards diversification,while their motives to change the largest shareholder become complicate. In this paper, the motives of the changing are analyzed from the view of stakeholders and game theory: the equipment of the interest is a significant factor. Due to difference of the investors'trading motive, they also perform different characteristic of behavior in the year of the changing of the largest shareholder. Sample of the study is the listed companies taken place the changing from 2000 to 2003, and the experimental study is used to analyze the characteristic of behaviors of the changed largest shareholder. By statistic method and binary Logistic regression,the behaviors of financing and great restructuring are analyzed; In order to find out the characteristic of behavior that the investor changes the main operation, and the characteristic of behavior of different identity investors, multinomial Logistic regression is used. And the main conclusions has been drown as following: in the year of the changing of the Largest shareholder, among the investors that pledged their share right, 62% pledge all their shares, the ratio of return on net asset is higher, and the asset-liability of the target company is lower, the inclination that the investor pledges its stock is greater; The investors carrying on great restructuring trade more stock, and their controlling right to target is relatively heavier, but they handle noncommercial income through earning management more seriously; Especially among the target changed the main operation, the range of handling income through earning management and the turnover of board are more than other companies; the investors'behaviors are different because of their different identity, after the private enterprise becoming the owner of listed company, its proportion of financing behavior is twice of the general corporate shareholder's, it is the state-owned shareholders that have the most behaviors of great restructuring even changing of main operation, the private enterprise trades less stock, but the control to its target is heavier, and the ratio of directors leaving one's post is larger in its target, the private enterprise handles noncommercial income more seriously, and it has greater impact on the increment of profit margin of main operation of the target. In this paper a utility model is made to study mechanism of the big shareholder acting improperly, and learn: the separation of control right and cash flow right is the basis that he could seek private interests of control right. The improper behavior of the changing of the Largest shareholder needs to take effective measures to prevent, such as establishing market of control right, weakening the right of the big shareholder.