The Game Theoretic Incentive Model Of P2P Based On Differential Quality Of Service

Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In particular, there is a free-rider problem in traditional peer-to-peer networks such as Napster: individual users are provided with no incentive for sharing their own files and thereby adding value to the network. As a result, a large number of academic and commercial projects are under way to develop P2P systems for various incentive mechanisms. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.In this paper, by analyzing the disadvantages of pure P2P Network------Gnutella, a new routing policy is proposed, which can effectively improve its scalability and reduce its redundancy in the transmission of information.Base on this Network model, the incentive issues that arise in such file sharing systems will be addressed. We construct a formal game theoretic model of the system and analyze equilibrium of user strategies under several situations.Finally, we give the result of the simulation of the incentive model using a distributed microeconomic flow control technique, which models the network as competitive markets. In these markets resource owners price their resources based on supply and demand, and users purchase resources so as to maximize their individual Quality of Service (QoS).