An Experimental Study On Colloge Admission Mechanism Based On Two-sided Matching Theory

In the traditional textbook, economics is used to efficiently allocate scarce resources. Many markets have a very important function, that is, each agent may be matched with one agent of the opposite set. Often, in economic systems, agents form pairs: workers and firms, physicians and hospitals, schools and students. The task of two-sided matching theory is to study this kind of function systematically.Two-sided matching theory, as a branch of game theory, is one of the outstanding part of the theory of games on both the theoretical and practical side. The theoretical part of the story begins in 1962, with the publication of the famous Gale-Shapley paper,"College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage."Since then, a large theoretical literature has grown. In practice, Roth published his discovery in 1984 that the famous Gale-Shapley algorithm had in fact been in practical use already since 1951 for the assignment of interns to hospitals in the United States; it had evolved by a trial-and-error process that spanned more than half a century. Nowadays, two-sided matching theory has been widely used in the labor markets and public school choice in the western countries.College admission mechanism is one of the two-sided matching mechanisms. In this paper, college admission mechanisms are chosen as research subjects, the two-sided matching mechanism is taken as theoretical basis, at first, this paper makes an description on theoretical model, and have an experimental research on students'preference structure to study what is preference consistency and preference difference in Chinese students. Then, based on these researches, there is the main experimental design, we select two information environments(low information environment and partial information environment), three types of matching mechanisms: choice-priority mechanism, parallel choice-priority mechanism and Gale-Shapley student optimal stable matching mechanism, especially, we take the parallel choice-priority mechanism into three conditions, which set three different numbers of choices, design ten experimental programs, and establish two types of evaluation (true preferences revealed the rate and efficiency levels)to evaluate experimental results. There are more than 10 kinds of experimental programs on the results for comparison. In this paper, experimental studies suggest that in these three mechanisms, the rate of true preferences revelation and efficiency of the mechanism is opposed to sensitivity to changes in the amount of information; in parallel choice enrollment system (the number of choices controlled within 2 to 4) , the sensitivity of efficiency generally disappears with choice number increasing.