A Risk Study Of State-assisted Loans For College Students Based On Game Theory

High default rate of state-assisted loans for college students results in high risk of banks—"credit grudging" of banks is a hot topic discussed by international society now. Scholars made extensive researches from different angles, such as economics, sociology, science of law and even ethics. Meanwhile, researches on subject's interests and risks of state-assisted loans for college students have become one of the focus of financial field. And relevant arguments followed one after another. However, they were expatiated just from a certain aspect. Hence, this thesis tries to study state-assisted loans for college students in China in a comprehensive way, which discusses from causes of risk existing in interests game between different bodies of state-assisted loans for college students in China. And from this, the author reaches the conclusion that the fundamental problem behind dilemma of current state-assisted loans for college students is: who should bear the loss in case of portfolio return is hard to cover the cost—how should the government, banks, colleges and universities and students rationally bear the cost and face the risks. The thesis, from the game process of different groups, draws a conclusion that the involved interest bodies should follow the principle of "risk sharing" based on the reasonable benefit and straighten out the relationships among them. The author put forward some practical and effective policy suggestions which can be adopted in our country on state-assisted loans for college students through an overall analysis combined with experience of other countries. In this thesis, the author holds that the direct reason that causes high default rate of state-assisted loans for college students is the rational game result of the involved bodies(the government, banks, colleges and universities and students) in pursuing their maximum interests based on some game rules(which mainly refer to the related rules made by the government to state-assisted loans for college students), under the objective conditions of educational cost sharing, asymmetric information and credit anomie, imperfect incentive mechanism and unfair risk-taking. Among the multiple non-cooperative games, the banks, who act as creditor, accept the important weight of the non-cooperative games and thus results in its low enthusiasm in loaning. Therefore, the author holds that it is urgent to establish and perfect individual credit systems, enhance both the incentive force of keeping-credit borrowing and punishing force of default borrowing, strengthen the government's function in institutional construction of the state-assisted loans for college students and exert the function of universities and colleges' in managing the state-assisted loans for college students.