Th Jurisprudential Fundaments Of Modern International Law

From international law came into being, the study on it began. In deferent domains of international law, many jurists studied deeply and precisely in diverse orientations. Today, with international intercourses being more and more frequent, the effect of international law is salience increasingly and the productions of international law emerge in endlessly. But how to breach the localization of internal law and establish the foundation and theory system of international law itself is still a question, which we can not avoid and is to be settled urgently. Though importing the production of game theory, this article is following the idea of from game to contract and tries to carve out a new way in study of international law. The article is composed of three parts. In chapter one, the article introduces the basic ideas of game theory. Though explaining "prisoners'dilemma", the most famous case, by payoff matrix, the author introduce game theory. Then, the author defines three basic conceptions of game theory, which are players, strategies and payoff, and analyses game theory on semantics. The author emphasizes particularly on the three suits of classification of game theory. After analyzing how the prisoners-A and B-choose the strategy of "confession, confession", the author explains the predicament of prisoners'dilemma and the conflict in the non-cooperative games between individual sense and collective sense. In order to get out of this predicament and realize "win-win"or "many-win", we must choose cooperative games. In chapter two, the article analyses the international relations by demonstration. First, the author introduces three kinds of traditional theories on study of international relations, which are the academic preparation of applying game theory to international relations. And the author expounds the feasibility and the preponderance of analyzing international relations and national behaviors by game theory. Second, on the base of data of the event that USA and USSR contended for hegemony, the author shows how USA and USSR determined their foreign policies according to the rules of game theory and points out the international treaties between USA and USSR are the result of gaming. Last, taking example for the trade dissension between Japan and China in 2001, the author analyses how the international entente achieved length by length in the game without"Nash Equilibrium". Chapter three is the key of this article. First, the author discusses the modern international relations, the appearance of modern nations and the signality of international order, which is a steady state of international relations. Second, the author demonstrates how to realize from game to contract. On the base of all analysis and examples hereinbefore, the author points out that it can be conquered that there are all kinds of interest conflicts in modern international society and many difficulties in bucking for international cooperation. The most important key is national interest in the change of from game to contract and from international non-cooperation to international cooperation. Third, international law is classified as abstract international law and concrete international law in order to realize that international law is regulated by not only rules but also contracts. Just as classical holders of social contract theory emphasizing it is important that society is ruled by social contract, the author also indicates that international social contract, abstract international law, is important for international society. At last, the author analyzes the status of international law in the globalization circumstances and the function it should make in the course of globalization.