Research And Redesign Of Incentive Mechanism Of University Owned Enterprise

Coming into being in a special historical period, the University Owned Enterprise isChina's unique form of business. In more than 20 years of development, China'sUniversity Owned Enterprises have made remarkable achievements. Some of thembecome notable/influential in China's Securities Market and some are vigorouslymarching forward. Behind their vigorous development, the effectiveness of incentivemechanism becomes a topic well worth discussing.Based on the game analyzation, the thesis analyzes the incentive mechanism ofChina's University Owned Enterprises and put forward the new thought ofmechanism reconstruction under the frame of Principal-Agent theory.First, the thesis makes a brief description of the object--University Owned Enterprise,and explores its nature from the angle of Contract Economics. In the second chapter,the author sumarises former thoeries related to business incentive. Then, in chapterthree, the author analyzes the game between stake holders under the Principal-Agentstructure of University Owned Enterprise. Here, the author creatively put forward theview of dual game in University Owned Enterprise and constructs a model to studythe behavior of managers. In Chapter Four, the conclusion part of the thesis, redesignof incentive mechanism is explored and the author clearly pointes out the specificdesign should be based on the specific study of every enterprise. In addition, theauthor extends the conclusion in chapter five and cites the actual case fromQtsinghua's practise.