Economic Analysis Of Soil Property Rights Institution Evolution

This thesis is to study the evolution of the institutions of soil property rights since the enforcement of HRS (Household Responsibility System). In contrast to the present available literature, this paper abides by the commonly accepted research criteria hi terms of form and content, is analyzed in the framework of New Institutional Economics systematicallyThe framework used in this paper: Compared with the wants of human beings, the resource possible in a certain period is scarce. This is the reason why human beings compete for it against each other The relative bargaining power and preferences of players determines each player ' s rights referring to the resource, namely property rights structure The institutions of property rights consist of the formal and informal rules governing property rights structure China has a population of 13 billion , in which the land that can be used, per capita is below the world level, for this reason, the value of land in china must be higher and competition for it must be harder. When I was a child, I often saw the neighboring villages fight for the debating land. Because property rights institutions are the players ' gaming result ,and not chosen artificially by a person ,the role played by the upper government should not be overstated and the existing institutions are not always effective and efficient. Property rights institution is not static. It will transit with the change of the preferences and comparative powers of players.According to this framework, the competition of the farmers village and town administration and upper administration for soil rights and the transition of soil property rights are analyzed. Firstly, the transition of soil property rights institution is divided into 3 stages: "HRS" "Leasing System" and "Private Property RightsSystem" in light of soil property rights structure, and the reasons of transition x the nature of collective ownership of soil are provided.In the second place, three specific cases are analyzed to demonstrate the competition between the farmers and village and town administration. The last part is intended to explore the nature of the upper administration and part played in the process of evolution of soil property rights institutions.The core ideas of this thesis can be described as follows: Soil property rights institutions are not chosen according to efficient and effective criteria, but a result of competition of players. Finally the ineffective and inefficient institutions are going to be replaced because of competition, especially the global comprehensive competition.