Game Analysis About The Evolution Of The Structure Of Factor Property Right

The firm is an organization which can create cooperative surplus. This cooperative surplus evolves from special benefits achieved by division and cooperation of material capital owner and non-material capital owner and the ownership of cooperative surplus determines the nature of firm. The Firm does not have independent ownership as an organic combo of factor assets union and labour union; it is property right of factor and property right of labour that does exist in fact.The key content of property right of factor is the residual claimancy of factor that is a narrowly-defined property right of factor, i.e. the claimancy for cooperative surplus of the firm. Different allocations of the property right of factor form different property systems of the firm and determines the relative performances of the firm. The degree to which the property right of factor has been realized depends on two aspects: efficiency factor and power factor. The former means the contribution of the factor its owner has put into the firm in the process of creating firm surplus; The latter includes: the degree of assets exclusiveness, the characteristics of the property right of factor , the state of market competition and the change of technological condition. Different division proportions of the firm surplus shared by individual factor owners determines different structures of the property right of factor and the system of the property right of factor is a steady manifestation of the structure of the property right of factor during a certain period. This system exists as a game equilibrium. The change of contributions and bargaining power of factor owners will result in the replacement of game equilibria, i.e. the evolution of the system of the property right of factor. Only when the firm possesses certain heterogeneous core knowledge and competence can it obtain monopoly position in the factor markets and gain super profit that exceeds the average profit. This heterogeneous core knowledge and competence originate in a long-term cooperation between material capital and human capital and can only take human capital as carriers. So in the course of the evolution of the system of the property right of factor there exists a trend that human capital owner will share more firm surplus. The manager stock option system and the plan that the staff hold stocks is the reflection of this trend in the reality. That the rational allocation of the property right of factor can promote firm performance offers the train of thought which can be drawn for the state-owned enterprise reform.