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Cooperative Governs Of The River Basin Water Pollution And The Research Of Compensation

Posted on:2010-01-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X F WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2121360278474126Subject:Applied Mathematics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The river basin is a spatial integrity and strengthened region. Not only the contact of the various physical features is exteremely closely ,but also the restriction and the influence among the upper, middle and lower basion, between the mainstream and tributaries is remarkable. If various areas can cooperate closely, the whole river basin will realise the maximum revenue.If areas carry out the rigional protectionism, the upstream and downstream will have the water pollution dispute. At present the question of the river basin water pollution is serious. In the absence of external intervention and the situation of polluting freely,the upstream which creates to the pollution of downstream doesn't need to compensate ,the upstream which pays for the cost of protecting water doesn't need to compensate so that they initiate the serious water pollution dispute.The water pollution dispute widely exists between the upstream and downstream ,between the province and the province ,between the city and the city ,between the country and the country ,which have restricted the development of economy and the stability of the society .Therefor how to solve this question is urgent.At present the domestic and foreign related literature about regarding the water pollution may be divided into two parts ,which include carrying on the qualitive analysis using game theory and establishing the mechanism of ecological compensation .These results have a certain practical significance for the government of the water pollution .After all ,the domestic research is at the start stage ,the results have the universality defficiency and the calculation of compensation have the issue of confusion.The article carries on the quantitative analysis with the game theory and constructs the model which permitting the polluents shift , assign, and subduce. Even if the cooperation will bring the basin whole the income growth, some regions also possibly think that free rider's income may be higher. The question is the chief obstacle for the cooperation government of the water pollution. This paper determines the compensation stadard with Nash Law, which provided the important method and the mentality for the regions to win altogether.The paper first instructs the situation and the reasons of the river basin water pollution, from these we can see the urgent of the government for the water pollution. Then this article analysises water pollution from the angle of economy and game theory .The conclusion is that the government of the water pollution must strengthen the regional cooperation and bring the negative exterior to internalization.Then this paper introduces the domestic and foreign related literature ,carrying on the commentary to the results and analysis the insufficiency of the studies. This article has development the model of non-cooperation subduction by plan and the model of cooperative game which permits shift and reduce the polluents. In order to guarantee the stability of the cooperative model ,this article distributes the benefit of cooperation using Nash Law and determines compensation which the regions obtain or pay for. The conclusion is that the kind of cooperative model can stimulate the various regions to cooperate and make full use of the advantage of the various regions to bring the maximum benefit for the whole basin.The model of the cooperative governs and compensation has vital practical significance which can avoid our country taking the old way polluting first and then government, reducing the load of the river, improving the ecological environment quality of the river, solving the dispute, enhance the river's economic potentiality, promting the development of the basin circulation economy.
Keywords/Search Tags:River Basin Water Pollution, the Model of Cooperative Governs, Nash Model, Distribution of Cooperative Interests, Compensation
PDF Full Text Request
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