Research On The Impact Of Government Policies And Measures On The High-quality Development Of State-owned Enterprise

After decades of exploration and practice after reform and opening up,China has figured out the correct path to achieve Chinese-style modernization.State-owned enterprises,as the backbone of the market economy and the mainstay of the national economy,coincide with the requirements of high-quality development in their inherent attributes,so promoting state-owned enterprises to take the road of a high-quality product plays a crucial role in the smooth realization of Chinese-style modernization.In the context of high-quality development and new development patterns,to solve the current problems and difficulties of state-owned enterprises,the government must introduce more comprehensive,flexible,and targeted policies to vigorously support and correctly guide the path of high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.The attributes of state-owned enterprises determine that the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises can not be separated from external government financial incentives.Government financial incentives as a national macroeconomic policy can focus on state-owned enterprise reform and upgrading,business expansion,capacity enhancement,technological innovation,and other aspects,can appropriately increase the multi-instrumental combination of support and coverage,targeted depth to promote the reform of state-owned enterprises,awakening the sensitivity of state-owned enterprises to the multi-instrumental combination of subsidies to strengthen the effect of government subsidies on the innovation of state-owned enterprise incentives.Through the external government financial incentives to stimulate the internal vitality and innovation of state-owned enterprises,accelerate the internal reform of enterprises.In addition,deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises is an inevitable move to achieve high-quality development,especially deepening the mixed ownership reform.Mixed-ownership reform,precise policy,closely integrated with the actual enterprise,do not engage in "one-size-fits-all",do not engage in "pull Lang match," prudent selection of strategic investors,to "mixed" to promote the "reform." "Reform".Deleveraging is an important task for China to cope with the increasing risk of debt accumulation and achieve the goal of high-quality economic development.The "deleveraging" policy is the government’s intervention and control of the corporate financing structure through a series of constraints and incentives by taking the corporate gearing ratio,interest-bearing debt ratio,and other accounting information as the policy grips.Deleveraging is one of the effective ways to achieve high-quality development.In promoting the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises,objective and scientific evaluation of the development quality of state-owned enterprises,as well as understanding the effective ways to improve the inherent high-quality development of enterprises,are particularly important and urgent.First,this paper selects the data of state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen to test the impact of government subsidies on the development quality of state-owned enterprises and explore whether R&D expenditures play a moderating effect between government subsidies and the development quality of state-owned enterprises.The empirical results of this paper show that(1)government subsidies will positively impact the development quality of state-owned enterprises,and strengthening government subsidies to a certain extent will boost the development quality of state-owned enterprises.The conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests,which,side by side,confirms the correctness of our government’s policy of supporting the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises,as well as explains the importance of state-owned enterprises making reasonable and full use of government subsidies.(2)The moderating effect test confirms that R&D expenditures significantly mediate between government subsidies and the development quality of SOEs.It provides a theoretical basis for state-owned enterprises to choose the way of utilizing government subsidies,and the use of government subsidies to alleviate the pressure and inject impetus into the R&D activities of enterprises can give full play to the positive role of government subsidies in enhancing the quality of the development of state-owned enterprises.(3)According to the nature of different industries,it is found that the positive impact of government subsidies on the quality of non-manufacturing SOEs is more obvious.The moderating effect of R&D expenditures of non-manufacturing SOEs is more obvious.According to the different regions of SOEs,it is found that government subsidies of SOEs in the central area have a more obvious positive impact on the quality of development of SOEs,and the moderating effect of In the central region,the positive impact of government subsidies on the development quality of state-owned enterprises is more obvious.In contrast,in the western part,the moderating effect of R&D expenditures of state-owned enterprises is more obvious,followed by the East.According to the city level of SOEs,it is found that the positive effect of government subsidies on the development quality of SOEs in key cities.provincial capitals is more obvious,and the moderating effect of R&D expenditures of SOEs in key cities is more obvious;lastly,according to the different natures of SOEs,it is found that: the positive effect of local government subsidies on the development quality of SOEs is more obvious,and the moderating effect of R&D expenditures of SOEs in key cities is more obvious.Finally,after dividing the state-owned enterprises into central and local state-owned enterprises according to their different nature,it is found that the positive effect of local government subsidies on the development quality of state-owned enterprises is more obvious.In contrast,the moderating effect of R&D expenditures of central and local state-owned enterprises is insignificant.Secondly,this paper selects the data of A-share companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the initial research samples.It explores the depth of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and the degree of equity checks and balances.The empirical results of this paper show that(1)mixed-ownership reform has a positive effect on the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises,and increasing the depth of mixed-ownership reform and the degree of equity checks and balances to a certain extent will promote the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.After a series of robustness tests on the empirical results,the findings still hold,which further illustrates the correctness of the Chinese government’s policy of adopting mixed-ownership reform to support the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises,as well as explains the necessity for state-owned enterprises to carry out mixed-ownership reform to realize the strategic goal of high-quality development.(2)Compared with manufacturing SOEs,the positive effect of equity checks and balances on the development quality of non-manufacturing SOEs is more obvious,while the depth of mixed-ownership reform has a more obvious effect on the promotion of the high-quality development of manufacturing SOEs;according to the different property rights of SOEs,SOEs are classified into central SOEs and local SOEs,and after grouping them to conduct empirical analyses,it is found that: in the test of the sample of local According to the different nature of ownership of state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises are divided into central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises,and the empirical analysis of the group found that: in the sample of local state-owned enterprises,it is found that the mixed ownership reform has a more obvious positive effect on the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.The sample of central state-owned enterprises found that the mixed ownership reform only significantly affects the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.According to the different regions where the state-owned enterprises are located,the group test found that the mixed ownership reform in the eastern region sample has a more obvious positive effect on the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.Finally,according to the size of SOEs,the quartile regression study found that the depth of mixed ownership reform has a more significant effect on the high-quality development of SOEs above the 0.75 quartile.In comparison,the degree of equity checks and balances substantially affects the high-quality development of SOEs above the 0.25 quartile.Finally,this paper uses data from A-share non-financial state-owned listed companies in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen cities from 2011 to 2020 to mainly investigate the impact of enterprise deleveraging on state-owned enterprises’ performance,whether the financial risk can regulate the effect of deleveraging on enterprises’ performance,as well as the differential impacts of deleveraging behaviors of state-owned enterprises in different industries,in other regions,and different stages of growth on the performance of enterprises.The empirical results of this paper show that(1)enterprise deleveraging can significantly enhance the performance of state-owned enterprises.The conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests,which verifies the accurate type of the direction of China’s supply-side structural reform.It provides a theoretical basis for the performance enhancement of highly leveraged enterprises.(2)The mediation effect test confirms that financial risk partly mediates the influence of deleveraging policy and the financial performance of SOEs.(3)According to the nature of industry grouping,deleveraging more significantly affects non-manufacturing state-owned enterprises.Considering the geographical influence,the deleveraging operation of SOEs in the western region has a more significant positive effect on improving enterprise performance.Finally,according to the grouping of enterprise growth,the deleveraging of low-growth SOEs can positively promote the substantial improvement of enterprise performance.Because high leverage is formed by long-term accumulation,under the constraints of the macro environment and economic situation,it is difficult to deleverage in one step.It is necessary for SOEs and the government to find the right force and make concerted efforts to establish a new mechanism for sustainable deleveraging.At the same time,securities companies,accounting firms,banks,and other financial and intermediary institutions should also actively monitor and guide the debt situation of state-owned enterprises.From the conclusion of the study,previous research on the development of state-owned enterprises,mostly based on investment,financing,innovation,government auditing and other government policies on state-owned enterprises to test the impact of a particular government policy,the lack of government incentive policies on the development of state-owned enterprises of high-quality systematic research.In this paper,we systematically sort out the role of government fiscal incentive policy,mixed ownership reform and deleveraging policy in the process of high-quality development of state-owned enterprises,and conduct an in-depth discussion and evaluation of government fiscal incentive policy,mixed ownership reform and deleveraging policy based on the same research framework.To a certain extent,it can make up for the shortcomings of the current research,and provide empirical reference and practical guidance for further giving full play to the role of government financial incentive policy,mixed ownership reform and deleveraging policy in the process of high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.