| The imbalance between supply and demand has become a major challenge for metro operations in large and medium-sized cities.In the context of the rapid development of shared transportation and the gradual change of the traditional transportation outlook,using bike-sharing as a booster to cope with the capacity matching problem of metro system is considered a viable solution.On the one hand,bike sharing is used as an alternative mode for short-distance metro travel to relieve peak congestion,and on the other hand,the "metro+bike sharing" feeder mode is used as a solution to filling up the last mile gap of metro trip to improve the attractiveness of metro services during peak hours.Based on the modeling methods of non-cooperative game(static game,dynamic game and timing game),this paper comprehensively applies mechanism design theory and information economics theory to discuss the strategic interactions between the metro and bike sharing in different periods.From the perspective of competition,the incentive mechanism based on passenger credit value is investigated,aiming at inducing the excess short-distance passenger flow in the metro system to the bike sharing system during peak hours;from the perspective of cooperation,the impact of different cooperation modes on the efficiency of "metro + bike sharing" connection is investigated and the operation mode selection and information sharing strategies of the metro system connected to shared bikes are further explored.The paper investigates the impact of different cooperation modes on the efficiency of "metro+bike sharing" and further explores the operation mode and information sharing strategy of metro system.The main research work of this paper is as follows.(1)This paper investigates the competitive pricing problem between metro and bike-sharing companies in the presence of government subsidies,and proposes a pricing scheme that combines differentiated pricing with a decision mechanism through passenger credits to induce excess shortdistance metro passengers to the bike sharing system.The impact of pricing order on the effectiveness of the pricing scheme is considered,and three implementation mechanisms reflecting different pricing orders are analyzed and compared.From the perspective of demand transfer,the pricing mechanism in which the metro company acts first has the best performance,while the participants in the integrated travel system have a backward-action advantage from the perspective of firm’s revenue.Based on the timing game theory,the pricing order of the endogenous decisionmaking participants is found to have two equilibrium pricing orders(two participants acting first,respectively)in the integrated travel system.Therefore,it is suggested that relevant government departments can give appropriate subsidies to metro companies to encourage them to prioritize pricing,thus achieving a win-win situation for enterprises,society,and government.(2)In this paper,we study the pricing of "metro+bike sharing" with credit incentives and government subsidies.Based on the credit pricing scheme proposed in Chapter 2,we further investigate the case where the government grants incentives to high credit-worthy travelers.At the same time,a Hotelling model is used to characterize the heterogeneity of travelers and add a constraint on the congestion reduction objective to the competitive pricing problem.Two types of governments are discussed:budget-adequate governments with the goal of maximizing social welfare and budget-limited governments with the goal of minimizing subsidy costs.The effects of credit pricing schemes under the two types of government subsidies are investigated separately,and the two subsidy schemes are fully compared in terms of key performance indicators such as travel demand,company’s revenue,and social welfare.The results show that metro is suspected of free-riding when implementing credit pricing schemes jointly with a government with sufficient budget.In addition,congestion reduction targets need to be set carefully,as overly aggressive targets not only hurt metro company’s revenue but also reduce social welfare.Adequate government budgets do not guarantee better implementation of credit pricing programs compared to the subsidy programs of the two types of governments.(3)This paper investigates the collaborative pricing of metro and bike sharing under different cooperation modes.The pricing strategies and efforts of the service providers under the cost-sharing and informationsharing cooperation modes are studied respectively,and the discussion is extended to the "cost-sharing + information-sharing" mixed cooperation mode.Secondly,we compare these cooperation modes with different performance indicators to reveal the advantages and disadvantages of each mode and its application scenarios.In addition,the impact of fairness concerns on the performance of the cooperation modes is explored by considering the unfair feelings of the relatively disadvantaged party in the cooperation.The results show that both cooperative modes are effective in achieving the demand promotion of integrated travel mode,and the superiority of both depends on the investment cost efficiency.However,the cost-sharing mode reduces the profits of bike-sharing firms,which means that bike-sharing firms have no incentive to adopt the mode unless they are willing to grab the market at the cost of profits.Further,the fairness concern mentality exhibited by bike-sharing firms in cooperation would weaken the advantages of the information-sharing mode and inversely enhance the advantages of the cost-sharing mode.(4)In this paper,we study the operation mode choice and information sharing strategy of the metro system under uncertain demand.Two modes of operation,"self-owned public bicycle" and "cooperation with bike sharing company",are considered,and the metro system has the ability to predict uncertain demand and the power to independently decide whether to share demand information.The value of information sharing is investigated for a given operating mode,and the differences in operating modes are compared for a given information sharing strategy.Further,two operating modes are allowed to co-exist to study the information sharing strategies of metro systems in a competitive environment.The results show that under single-mode operation,the information sharing offered by the metro company helps to achieve a win-win situation in the integrated "metro+bike" mobility system,and that accurate demand information is more effective in improving the bike-sharing company’s profit.In dualmode operation,the introduction of competition may lead to a "forecasting trap" for the metro company,who needs to make rational decisions and avoid blindly pursuing high accuracy when developing demand forecasting programs.Our findings are of practical significance in narrowing the discrepancy between supply and demand in metro system,and can provide relevant theoretical basis and practical guidance for strategy makers to make timely strategic adjustments in the face of changes in the market environment. |
