| In venture capital projects,innovation ability is one of the key factors to determine whether investors will inject capital or not and the growth space of enterprise value.Therefore,in the growth process of enterprises,investors and entrepreneurs will attach great importance to enhancing the innovation ability of enterprises,because the efforts made by entrepreneurs play a decisive role in the value of innovation projects.In this case,it is harder for venture capitalists to do a good job of designing financial contracts that incentivize entrepreneurs to put in the kind and degree of effort that investors want.From the perspective of investors,this thesis studies the following three situations according to the investors’ observation degree of entrepreneurial innovation projects: Investors partly observe the entrepreneur’s innovation behavior –the value of innovation projects has random variables,investors cannot observe entrepreneur’s innovation behavior – the value of innovation projects outside entrepreneur’s plan is post-distributed;investors can observe the entrepreneur’s innovation behavior in the whole process – the value distribution of innovation projects within entrepreneur’s plan is agreed in advance.This paper establishes models for innovation projects in the above three situations,studies how investors can more effectively motivate entrepreneurs to innovate.The main contents are as follows:(1)The research on entrepreneurial innovation behaviors that investors can only partially observe shows that: As for the incentive coefficient of the optimal compensation contract,when the value of the innovation project fluctuates relatively small,the optimal contract given by investors to the entrepreneurs with high efficiency of innovation efforts will contain a higher incentive coefficient.However,when the value of the innovation project fluctuates greatly,the entrepreneurs with higher efficiency of innovation efforts will not get a higher incentive coefficient.However,the change of the incentive coefficient of the optimal contract with respect to the standard effort efficiency is positive monotonic.For the fixed salary part,when the value of the innovation project fluctuates too much or too little,the fixed salary part of the optimal contract accepted by entrepreneurs with high innovation effort efficiency will be lower.Only when the fluctuation of the value of the innovation project is within a certain range,the two will change positively.When the standard effort efficiency increases,The fixed salary part of the optimal contract will show a changing trend of first rising and then falling.In addition,the two optimal effort levels chosen by entrepreneurs are also affected by the change of in their respective effort efficiency.For entrepreneurs with higher innovation effort efficiency,the optimal level of both efforts increases with the increase of their respective efficiency.For entrepreneurs with higher standard effort efficiency,the optimal level of standard effort still changes in the same direction as their own efficiency,and the optimal level of innovation effort also changes in the same direction as their own efficiency when the fluctuation of the value of the innovation projec is small.However,when the fluctuation of the value of the innovation projec is too large,the optimal level of innovation effort chosen by the entrepreneur decreases with the increase of the efficiency of the innovation effort.It can be seen that encouraging entrepreneurs to make innovative efforts that affect the fluctuation of the value of the innovation projec is more complex than motivating them to make standard work efforts and is related to the value fluctuation of innovative projects.Therefore,we add the learning process of venture capitalists on innovative project information into the multiphase dynamic model.The research on this model shows that: The learning mechanism added in the process enables investors to accumulate information about innovative projects,reduces monotonously the fluctuation of the value of innovative projects,and makes the investor-entrepreneur cooperation more efficient.Under the condition that the retention utility of entrepreneurs remains unchanged,the expected returns of enterprises and investors increase monotonically.In order to keep the real wage at a high level,entrepreneurs are not only willing to reduce their effort cost coefficient,but also more willing to improve the efficiency of innovation effort than to improve the efficiency of a standard effort.(2)For the study of entrepreneurial innovation behavior that cannot be observed by investors,we establish the optimal financial contract of the continuous time venture capital project decision problem model to stimulate entrepreneurs’ unplanned innovation under the condition of information asymmetry.The unplanned innovation work refers to the entrepreneur’s standard work process is easier to find the innovation points that promote enterprise development and make efforts for them,but before the innovation results are realized,Investors do not observe the innovative work done by entrepreneurs.On this basis,the model of the problem is established,and the explicit optimal decision is obtained.Matlab programming is used to conduct numerical simulation and comparative static analysis of the optimal decision of investors and entrepreneurs.The research shows that investors can encourage entrepreneurs to allocate more energy to unplanned innovation by reducing the self-growth rate of enterprise scale,reducing the coefficient of return of enterprise scale,reducing the incentive compensation of entrepreneurs’ standard work,reducing the investment in enterprises and extending the duration of investment projects as much as possible,so as to enhance the innovation ability of enterprises.(3)For the study of entrepreneurial innovation behavior that can be observed throughout the process by investors,we establish the optimal financial contract of the continuous time venture capital project decision problem model under the condition of information asymmetry,in which the planned innovation refers to the innovative work done by the entrepreneur agreed by the investor and the entrepreneur in advance,and the investor can observe the whole process.On this basis,the model of the problem is established,and the explicit optimal decision is obtained.Numerical simulation and comparative static analysis are carried out for the optimal decision of investors and entrepreneurs.The study says: Because investors have the information advantage,they can choose entrepreneurs with strong innovation ability and low effort cost,and choose the planned innovation projects with higher entrepreneur specialization,so as to increase the incentive coefficient for entrepreneurs and investment in enterprises.By providing entrepreneurs with more stable fixed salary policies and shortening the duration of investment projects as much as possible,entrepreneurs are encouraged to allocate more energy to the planned innovation work,so as to enhance the innovation ability of enterprises.(4)On the basis of the above research,based on the above research,we compare and analyze the models established in different contexts and the optimal solutions obtained and their related conclusions,so as to find out the difference between the optimal decision chosen by investors when facing two different types of entrepreneurial innovation behavior,explore the reasons and give a reasonable economic explanation.The study says: First,from the perspective of the structure of the two optimal solutions,when the innovation project changes from unplanned to planned,both investors and entrepreneurs can observe the value process of the innovation project.Therefore,the parameters of innovation projects,such as the specificity of innovation projects,the effort efficiency of innovation efforts in the entrepreneur plan and the attenuation coefficient of innovation project value in the plan,have a direct impact on the decision-making of investors,which is in line with the background assumptions of our model.Secondly,compared with the unplanned innovation developed by entrepreneurs and investors,investors have more information and greater say,while entrepreneurs have lower enthusiasm for efforts.At the same time,investors in a relatively dominant position in the game have more diverse choices,more flexible incentive and punishment measures,and stricter requirements on the efficiency and cost of entrepreneurs’ efforts when the innovation project is planned.Moreover,when the innovation project is within the plan,investors can observe the value accumulation process of the innovation project throughout the whole process.Therefore,compared with the unplanned innovation developed by entrepreneurs themselves,investors pay more attention to the innovation project and value realization of the innovation project.Finally,when the innovation project is within the plan,investors are more sensitive to the change of in the project duration,and the change of parameters in the later stage of the project will lead to a greater degree of change in investors’ decisions.By comparing the above conclusions,it can be found that when the information available to investors is different,the measures and incentives that can be taken to encourage entrepreneurs to innovate are very different.More information advantages enable investors to take more measures,and the requirements for entrepreneurs are also more strict,which further explains the importance of information.The research of this thesis provides guidance for investors to encourage entrepreneurs to innovate and provides new ideas and theories for improving the innovation ability of start-ups in venture capital projects. |
