Research On Incentive Contracts Design Of Project Supply Chain With Random Completion Time

In recent years,with the acceleration of the pace of market change,enterprises must constantly change the operation mode to adapt to the new competitive environment.The rapid launch of new products or customized products has become important means for many enterprises to meet the rapid changes in consumer demand.Under the new environment,the traditional mass production supply chain is gradually evolving into a new supply chain structure composed of individual projects,which is called projectdriven supply chain in academia.Meanwhile,many enterprises began to shift from internal independent innovation to external collaborative innovation to seek the collaboration of supply chain members,and joint innovation with supply chain partners became the first choice for most enterprises.Different from the traditional manufacturing supply chain,project supply chain combines the advantages of supply chain management and project management.Project-based organizations become increasingly dependent on the suppliers,therefore supply chain risks may arise.Project supply chain usually requires complementary knowledge and technology,division of labor and cooperation,and common completion of specific tasks among supply chain members.Project supply chain usually focuses on relatively low demand frequency,and multiple supply chain members creatively complete the complementary tasks in a specific period of time to ultimately achieve the success of the entire project.It requires all supply chain members to work together to complete the project on time with the guarantee of project quality and quantity,so time uncertainty has become a major challenge for project supply chain management in addition to the quantity uncertainty of traditional supply chain.Economic research has proved that effective incentive mechanism can reduce or eliminate the free-riding and hitch problem among cooperative members.Therefore,in the context of project supply chain,how to stimulate the enthusiasm of project supply chain members to ensure that the objectives of supply chain members are consistent with the overall objectives of the supply chain is the key issue to realize the efficiency of project supply chain.Improper incentives will bring great loss to the project supply chain.This dissertation considers a scenario in which a manufacturer outsources two parallel subprojects(or parts)to two different suppliers,and the subproject completion time is stochastic.Due to a number of factors such as technical problems or capability differences between the two suppliers,the duration times of the two subprojects are usually different.Thus,the result may be that one supplier finishes early(the faster supplier)and another supplier finishes late(the slower supplier).Manufacturers’ profits may be harmed by the asynchronization.Based on the above background,this dissertation mainly discusses the incentive contracts design of project supply chain with random completion times,and the main work of this dissertation is reflected in the following four aspects:1.Project supply chain optimization based on no-delayed payment contract.Assume that the manufacturer cannot begin to work until all subprojects has been completed or all parts have been delivered.The early completion or quick delivery of parts by the faster supplier has no additional benefit other than the carrying cost to the manufacturer,whose time line depends on the slowest project completion of parts delivery.Therefore,this dissertation proposes a penalty incentive mechanism for the supplier who finish later,and he will be punished by the manufacturer.This dissertation considers two types of penalty mechanism for the slower supplier: mild punishment scheme and total punishment scheme.2.Project supply chain optimization based on delayed payment contract.For the supplier who completes earlier,he cannot receive payment from the manufacturer until both subprojects are completed or both parts are delivered,which is often referred as delayed payment scheme.On the basis of study(1)on the penalty mechanism design for slower supplier,the incentive mechanism of delayed payment to the faster supplier is taken into account.Therefore,this dissertation considers incentive contract design issue from two dimensions: one is to incentivize the faster supplier,the other is to incentivize the slower supplier.3.Project supply chain optimization based on partial-delayed payment contract.Partial-delayed incentive scheme is proposed,that is,faster supplier can receive a part of the payment from manufacturer when he completes his subproject,and when both subprojects are completed,he can receive the remaining payment,which is a kind of intertemporal incentive mechanism.On the basis of study(1)on the penalty mechanism design for slower supplier,the incentive mechanism of partial-delayed payment to the faster supplier is taken into account.Therefore,two dimensions of incentive mechanisms are combined together to optimize the incentive contract design mechanism in this dissertation.4.Project supply chain optimization based on deadline contract.In real-life applications,it is common to set a deadline when managing projects,which is often accompanied by incentives of rewards and punishments.Supplier will be rewarded if he meets deadline;otherwise,if the deadline is missed,then he will be punished.Under the outsourcing environment of two parallel subprojects,this dissertation studies the incentive contract design mechanism based on deadline constraint by combining the supplier’s completion time asynchronism with the deadline incentive method.In summary,based on the outsourcing background of two parallel subprojects with stochastic project completion time,this dissertation designs four categories of incentive contracts and analyzes the effectiveness of incentive mechanism.The results will provide theoretical basis and practical reference for the operation of project supply chain enterprises.