Research On Operation Mode And Management Mechanism Of Prefabricated Production Of Mega Projects

In the prefabricated production of mega projects,the components are prefabricated by the factory,then transported to the construction site for installation.This production method not only achieves standardized production and quality stability of the prefabricated parts through specialization and automated prefabrication processes.It can also achieve high-efficiency production through technological breakthroughs and innovations,while avoiding environmental risks at the construction site,and has become one of the most important sustainability project management practices.However,in the prefabricated production of mega projects,complexities such as high technical difficulty,large demand,high quality requirements,and multi-objective,multi-subject conflicts have emerged.In order to deal with these complexities,this paper has conducted in-depth research on the operation mode and management mechanism of prefabricated production of mega projects.The main research contents and research results are shown in the following aspects.Firstly,in order to deal with the incentive issues in prefabricated production,an incentive model with reputational concerns from the perspective of the project owner is established and how this incentive affects supplier’s effort and project owner’s profit is investigated.In addition,considering the limited rationality of the owner,an incentive mechanism with constant total incentive intensity is established.The result shows that when the reputation incentive is considered in the incentive contract,both supplier’s effort and project owner’s profit all increase.The introduction of reputational incentives with constant incentive intensity can also increase the level of effort of the supplier and the benefits of the owner.Furthermore,in order to reduce the information asymmetry of reputation observation,a two-stage dynamic incentive model which combines double reputation mechanism with explicit incentive mechanism is established,and the incentive mechanism is analysed.Then,the model is compared with a model of explicit incentive contract without reputation mechanism and conditions of pareto improvement are obtained.The research shows that it can coordinate the cooperation relationship between owner and prefabrication suppliers when reputation mechanism is introduced in certain conditions.Secondly,by using evolutionary game theory,this paper made research on the cooperation mechanism between prefabrication suppliers in mega project,analyzed the influence factors of bilateral cooperation,and then studied the impact of the incentive and punishment mechanism when the owner participated in.Furthermore,an evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation tendency of multisuppliers,which have different production capacity for different products.Then,fourteen “when-then” type scenarios are concluded and classified into six different evolutionary tracks.Meanwhile,the critical influencing factors are identified.The results show that the suppliers’ production capacity,owner-supplier contract and the owner’s incentive mechanism influence the cooperation tendency of suppliers directly.Multi-suppliers also influence each other’s behavior.Thirdly,in order to study the profit distribution in prefabrication production of mega projects,the paper designs a profit distribution model between two suppliers who have moral hazard.Given the spillover effect,the paper gives the optimal profit distribution mechanism,the optimal input level and the optimal benefit,as well as the influence of spillover effect.In addition,based on the differences of decision environment,decision order and decision purpose,the paper designs two dynamic game models which is decentralized decision making model and centralized decision making model.Given the difference between contractor and supplier,the model highlights the weight of contribution.Then the paper gives the best profit distribution mechanism,the best effort and the best benefit,as well as takes comparative analysis and numerical modeling.The research shows that when contractor’s effort and supplier’s effort all have the impact on the output,the profit must be shared which can incent the enthusiasm of collaboration.The distribution coefficient is only affected by the weight of output contribution.When the bilateral moral hazard exists,the contractor’s benefit in decentralized decision making model is higher than its in centralized decision making model,so contractor prefer to choose decentralized model,while the supplier is inverse.The paper also indicates that the benefit of the supply chain system is optimal in centralized decision making model.Finally,this paper considers a repeated duopoly game of prefabrication suppliers in mega infrastructure projects and assumes the suppliers exhibit bounded rationality.Based on the theory of bifurcation of dynamical systems,a dynamic price competition model is constructed considering different competition strategies.Accordingly,the stability of the equilibrium point of the system is discussed considering different initial market capacities,and numerical simulation is performed.The results show the system has a unique equilibrium solution when initial capacity is high and the parameters meet certain conditions.The suppliers’ price adjustment strategy has an important influence on system stability.However,an overly aggressive competition strategy is not conducive to system stability.Moreover,the system is sensitive to initial parameter values.