At present,the new generation of information technology and a new round of industrial revolution are promoting the transformation of traditional manufacturing to service-oriented manufacturing.Manufacturing enterprises have extended their value chain and gained new profits growth points through the business model transformation from providing “products” to providing “products + services”.Among many durable products services,after-sales support and maintenance services take a long time in the product life cycle.However,with the rapid development of modern society and economy,durable consumer goods such as automobiles,air conditioners,computers and so on are gradually popularized.The gap between product quality guarantee period and its service life is further widened.After the warranty period,the hidden dangers of various parts and components are increased.The product will inevitably face the problem of maintenance,so consumers will pay a lot of extra expenses for this.As a result,product extended warranty service(EWS)have risen rapidly and attracted wide attention from consumers and enterprises as soon as they were launched.As an emerging business extending in the industry chain,EWS expands after-sales service in terms of time and content,improves consumer satisfaction and brand loyalty,and becomes an important means for enterprises to seize the market and establish brand loyalty.At the same time,it has become an important source of new profits for enterprises.Manufacturers as the product provider are the first to introduce EWS,and then retailers have launched EWS.Since the EWS is attached to the product,the product and the EWS have complementary effects.The introduction of the EWS will often affect the pricing and channel mode of the product.Conversely,the pricing and channel mode of the product will also affect the pricing and channel mode of the EWS mode.Supply chain products and EWS pricing and channel mode will be more complex when considering both the product market and the EWS market.Therefore,how to balance the relationship between after-sales and marketing,design reasonable pricing and channel mode of products and EWS becomes the key issue for manufacturers and retailers to gain competitive advantages and achieve profits growth.In the existing research,the research on product EWS is mainly based on product single channel and single entity providing EWS.In fact,on the one hand,the development of the Internet and information technology has enabled more and more manufacturers to sell products through dual-channel;on the other hand,due to the higher profits of EWS,there is a situation that manufacturer and retailer provide EWS at the same time in the supply chain.Therefore,based on the different product channel structures,this dissertation studies the channel strategies of single entity(manufacturer or retailer)providing EWS and double entities providing it(manufacturer and retailer),providing decision-making reference for enterprises to maximize profits and improve the performance of supply chain system.This dissertation studies the supply chain EWS channel strategies based on different product channel structure and EWS provider in the supply chain.Firstly,in the case of single agent providing EWS,the strategies of EWS channel in supply chain based on single channel and dual-channel are studied respectively.Next,in the case of manufacturer and retailer providing EWS at the same time,this dissertation studies the supply chain based on competition of EWS under single product channel.Finally,the open strategies of the EWS is studied when the product has dual-channel.This dissertation consists of four parts:First,we study the supply chain EWS channel strategies based on product single channel.Considering the important impact of product quality on supply chain EWS,we take the quality as an endogenous variable,and develop three Stackelberg game models,i.e.,no EWS model,EWS provided by manufacturer model and EWS provided by retailer model.The optimal solutions of each model are analyzed and compared.Finally,a numerical example is used to analyze the sensitivity of the parameters in the model.The research shows that:(1)Both the product quality levels and the product demands are higher when EWS exists than no EWS.In most cases,EWS provided by retailers can get higher product quality levels,product demands and EWS demands.(2)Both retailer and manufacturer can get more profits from each other’s EWS.(3)From the perspective of retailer,who providing EWS is more favorable depends on the EWS cost coefficient ratio between manufacturer and retailer,the correlation coefficient between the product failure rate and product quality,etc.From the perspective of manufacturer,it is optimal for manufacturer to offer EWS by himself when manufacturer’s EWS costs have a greater advantage than that of retailers.Otherwise,it is optimal for manufacturer to ask retailer to offer EWS.Second,we study the supply chain EWS channel strategies based on product dualchannel.Based on the products dual-channel,we develop three Stackelberg game models,i.e.,no EWS,EWS provided by manufacturer model and EWS provided by retailer model.The optimal solutions of each model are analyzed and compared.Finally,a numerical example is used to analyze the sensitivity of the parameters in the model.The research shows that:(1)The wholesale price of products will be reduced when the manufacturer provides EWS.Whether the manufacturer or the retailer provides EWS,both the manufacturer and retailer will reduce the retail price of products in their respective channels.(2)Manufacturer or retailer providing EWS can increase products demand in the supply chain.(3)Both manufacturer and retailer can get more profits by offering EWS themselves,and get more profits from each other’s EWS.(4)From the perspective of manufacturer,it is optimal for manufacturer to offer EWS by himself when manufacturer’s direct sales channel is more attractive.Otherwise,it is optimal for manufacturer to ask retailer to offer EWS.Third,we study the dual-channel strategies of manufacturer’s EWS and the choice of retailer’s EWS when both manufacturer and retailer providing EWS.Using the Stackelberg game method,the model of the manufacturer’s dual-channel sales EWS and the retailer’s self-operating EWS was established,and the results of the two models were compared and analyzed.Finally,a numerical example is used to analyze the sensitivity of the parameters in the model.The research shows that:(1)The manufacturer’s EWS dual-channel mode do not always increase profits,and the retailer self-operating EWS is not always optimal.(2)When consumers are more sensitive to the EWS price,the manufacturer’s single channel sales EWS,while the retailer’s selfoperating EWS is the best EWS sales strategies for both sides;When consumers are not sensitive to the EWS price,the manufacturer’s dual-channel sales EWS and retailer’s distribution manufacturer’s EWS are the optimal EWS strategies for both sides.(3)When the manufacturer’s EWS cost is small,and the retailer’s EWS cost is high,the manufacturer’s dual-channel sales EWS and retailer’s distribution manufacturer’s EWS are the optimal EWS strategies for both sides.If the manufacturer’s EWS cost is high,and the retailer’s EWS cost is small,the manufacturer’s single channel sales EWS,while the retailer’s self-operating EWS is the best EWS sales strategies for both sides.Fourth,we study the supply chain EWS open strategies based on product dualchannel and EWS competition.Considering the dual-channel supply chain,a manufacturer(he)sells the product through a retailer(she)and keeps a direct channel himself.Meanwhile,they provide EWS for consumers with heterogeneous quality levels.According to their strategies whether to open the EWS to the other channel,we have three scenarios: non-open,i.e.,no firm provides EWS to the consumers purchasing products in the other channel),single-open,i.e.,the manufacturer(retailer)provides EWS to the consumers in the retailer(manufacturer),and dual-open,i.e.,both provide EWS to all the consumers.Utility function is used to construct the demand function of EWS under three open strategies.Using the Stackelberg game method,we build a theoretical model to study the pricing strategies and EWS open strategies of the manufacturer and retailer.By comparing the three settings,our analysis yields the following four sets of insights:(1)If the manufacturer opens his EWS,the wholesale price of products will be reduced,so it does not always promise a higher profit.Meanwhile,the retailer’s EWS price falls.But the retail price may rise when the cost efficiency of the manufacturer providing EWS is high.Thus,the retailer may also benefit from the manufacturer’s EWS open strategy.(2)If the retailer opens her EWS,the wholesale price of products will be reduced further,but the EWS price is not affected.(3)If the manufacturer’s EWS cost efficiency is low,his opening up the EWS can increase the profit of himself and the retailer at the same time,on the contrary,it will reduce the profit of himself and the retailer at the same time.We further conduct a numerical study to show when should the manufacturer and the retailer open their EWS.(4)Our numerical study shows that The retailer should always open her EWS to all consumers.The manufacturer should do so when the retailer’s EWS quality is low,or the manufacturer’s EWS cost efficiency is low.At the same time,both the manufacturer and retailer should open their EWS,which is the optimal strategy for both sides.The main contributions are as follows:First,considering the important impact of product quality on supply chain EWS,we take the quality as an endogenous variable,and develop three models,i.e.,no EWS model,EWS provided by manufacturer model and EWS provided by retailer model.Based on theoretical analysis and case study,this dissertation expounds the different EWS modes and its influence on decision-making subjects,which has important practical implications.Based on the comparative analysis of the three models,the factors affecting the decision-making of the manufacturer and retailer are analyzed,and the basic model of EWS based on quality is established,which has important theoretical value.Second,the product dual-channel is introduced in the EWS supply chain.Under the product dual-channel,we develop three models,i.e.,no EWS model,EWS provided by manufacturer model and EWS provided by retailer model.The results were compared with the single channel of the product,and the existing literature was supplemented and expanded.Third,based on the demand of the product market,we develop a competition model of EWS between a manufacturer and a retailer,and expound the EWS dualchannel strategies of the manufacturer and the EWS selection strategies of the retailer.This provides a reference for the EWS strategies of the EWS competition supply chain node enterprise,which has certain practical significance and theoretical value.Fourth,we study the EWS open strategies for a manufacturer and a retailer in product dual-channel supply chain when both the manufacturer and the retailer provide EWS.By describing the transfer of the EWS demand between the manufacturer and the retailer through utility function,the EWS demand function of the manufacturer and retailer under product competition and EWS competition is constructed.The open problems of the EWS between the manufacturer and retailer is studied,which opens up a new perspective for the study of EWS. |