Research On Government-enterprise Cooperation Reserve Strategy Of Emergency Relief Materials

The emergency relief material reserve is an important part of emergency response and a stabilizer to prevent and defuse significant risks.In recent years China has established a relatively complete emergency relief material reserve system,which provides an important guarantee for effectively responding to various emergencies.But the increased public threat and destructiveness of frequent emergencies recently has raised higher requirements for the construction of emergency relief material reserve system.The outbreak of COVID-19 has also exposed the shortcomings and deficiencies of China’s emergency relief material support system,especially the selection of emergency relief material reserve mode and the extended decision-making problems which are needed to be further optimized.This paper focuses on the emergency relief material reserve and studies how to establish and improve the socialized reserve mechanism of emergency relief materials by relying on social forces and market mechanism,and give full play to the active role of social power in the reserve of emergency relief materials.Therefore,this paper firstly summarizes the research on domestic and foreign emergency scenarios,emergency relief materials supply and demand,emergency relief materials allocation and reserve,and emergency relief material reserve model,points out the problems and deficiencies of previous researches,introduces the theoretical bases such as repurchase contract theory and quantity elasticity contract,and clarifies the research direction.Secondly,this paper establishes a general theoretical analysis framework for the multi-subject cooperation of emergency relief materials,systematically reviews the development process and existing problems of the reserve model of emergency relief materials in China,demonstrates the necessity of introducing socialized reserves to China by combing and learning from foreign advanced experiences,then points out the influencing factors of the selection of emergency relief materials reserve model,and analyzes the optimal reserve of emergency relief materials,the interest relationship of multiple subjects,and the game theory between government and enterprises in emergency relief materials reserve.Furthermore,the multi-period dynamic reservation problem under the government contracting with a remanufacturing enterprise is discussed,and the impact of remanufacturing cost savings on the government’s the multi-period dynamic reservation strategy is analyzed.Thirdly,from the perspective of considering the quality difference of emergency relief materials and corporate social responsibility,this paper analyzes the strategic analysis of the government’s physical reserve of emergency relief materials.Since then,this paper mainly discusses the government’s decision on the emergency relief material reserve in the case of single supplier and multiple suppliers.Then,under the bi-level programming model that maximizes the satisfaction of the disaster areas and minimizes the supply risk,the optimal reserve strategy of emergency relief materials is studied.On this basis,using the Stackelberg dynamic game model to study the multi cycle dynamic reserve problem of government and production enterprises in the mixed reserve strategy of agreement physical and production capacity.Finally,this paper designs a guarantee mechanism and regulatory mechanism for the socialized reserve of emergency relief materials,ensuring sufficient quantity,good quality,storage safety,and operation compliance.It also further provides more detailed decision-making references for the formulation of China’s emergency material reserve policies.The main research content and conclusions of this article are as follows:(1)Based on the shortcomings in the practice of emergency relief material reserve model,a general theoretical analysis framework for the cooperation of multiple entities in emergency material reserve has been constructed based on relevant theoretical foundations.Research has found that the reserve mode of emergency relief materials is determined by the combination of reserve subjects and reserve methods.The reserve subjects of emergency relief materials are divided into two major parts: the government and the material supply chain enterprises.The reserve methods of emergency disaster relief materials are divided into government physical reserves,agreement physical reserves,and production capacity reserves.The quality differences of emergency relief materials,the social responsibility of cooperative enterprises,the number of cooperative enterprises and their production capacity are key factors that affect the effectiveness of the reserve model.(2)Studied the optimal reserve strategy when the government’s emergency relief materials are stored in physical form.This part introduces three factors: the quality level of emergency relief materials,corporate social responsibility factors and government subsidies.Based on the Stackelberg game process,linear programming models are constructed respectively.Research has found that the government only needs to predict expected demand,and the main decision-making goal is to optimize procurement costs and improve public satisfaction,that is,to maximize the protection of people’s life safety in the event of disasters.At the same time,the government should consider both the reliability of supplier guarantee capability and the ability to bear social responsibility when selecting suppliers,and strengthen cooperation with enterprises with strong production capacity and social responsibility.(3)Studied the optimal reserve strategy for government emergency relief supplies in the form of physical and contractual reserves.In this part,the optimal decision analysis is carried out under the conditions of sufficient and insufficient pre disaster reserves under the conditions of agreement single supplier and agreement multi supplier.Research has found that the government’s measures to share the cost of enterprise reserves have brought a cost burden,and cannot achieve a win-win situation between the government and enterprises.Therefore,government and enterprises should seek a more effective contractual approach.The government should establish good contract mechanisms with suppliers,such as quantity flexibility contracts,option contracts,and a combination of long-term and short-term contracts,to better respond to demand uncertainty risks.When selecting suppliers for physical agreements,the government should consider the reliability indicators of the supplier,such as market size,reputation,distance from potential disaster areas,logistics network and surrounding transportation convenience.(4)We studied the optimal reserve strategy for government emergency relief supplies in the form of a mixture of physical,contractual,and production capacity reserves.Consider two scenarios: emergency relief supplies are stored in a mixed form of physical and production capacity,and in a mixed form of agreement physical and production capacity.This section further extends the “physical reserve” to “capacity reserve”,introducing a two-level programming model to maximize satisfaction in disaster areas and minimize supply risk.The first scenario is analyzed using three scenarios.Research has found that the amount of production capacity reserves is influenced by the degree of disaster risk;When the frequency of regional disasters is relatively low,the government should mainly rely on physical reserves locally,supplemented by appropriate production capacity reserves;When the frequency of regional disasters is high,the government should not only increase its pre disaster physical reserves,but also continue to maintain a high production capacity reserve.