| After the Soviet Union succeeded in launching Sputnik I ahead of the United States in 1957,the ruling group of the United States,which held the decision-making power,created a panic atmosphere at home and vigorously advocated the so-called "missile gap" out of the need to pursue the foreign strategy of global hegemony and with the motive of seizing the political and economic interests of their own small groups.The political ambition of the US intelligence community expanded,and its reconnaissance capability was indeed inadequate,so the intelligence community catered to the needs of related interest groups and cooperated with the "missile gap panic" that lasted for several years.In this process,the U.S.intelligence community was deeply involved in the domestic political struggle with its special status,rapidly expanded its power,and even became one of the central decision-making departments.However,the ruling group represented by Eisenhower,while using intelligence agencies,took various ways from the top design to put the intelligence agencies in fierce internal competitions,and generally held the leadership of intelligence services,which had a profound impact on American national strategic culture in the future.This paper attempts to start from this special period,through the study of the American intelligence system in the period of "missile gap",to conclude some general relations between intelligence and decision-making,not only to examine the internal mechanism of "intelligence" itself,such as intelligence system and intelligence work,but also to explore the relationship between "intelligence" and "strategy" and "decision-making",and their ultimate effect on the national security and foreign policy of the United States.This paper focuses on five parts: the first part introduces the concept,connotation,characteristics of strategic intelligence and the American intelligence system in the early Cold War,laying the foundation for the research of this paper.The second part introduces the implementation of US strategic intelligence missions during the "missile gap",including the basic strategic situation of this period,the "missile gap" debate and the US means of conducting intelligence reconnaissance.The third part focuses on the US National Intelligence Estimate during the "missile gap" period,studies the formation,deliberation and impact mechanism,and examines these assessments specifically.The fourth part is to analyze the relationship between strategic intelligence and US government decision-making based on the second and third parts,focusing on the mutual impact between the two.The last part is the conclusion and research foothold of this article,explaining the role and status of strategic intelligence in American decision-making.According to the mistakes of US Intelligence community in the period of "missile gap",this paper puts forward the problems that we should pay attention to in carrying out strategic intelligence work.This paper holds that intelligence work serves strategic decision-making,and intelligence is affiliated to decision-making.They coexist under the same political system,essentially composed of the same group and the same class.Both of their demands and strategic objectives for defending the country,safeguarding and expanding national interests are highly consistent.Generally speaking,the intelligence community always has the original impulse to become a decision maker,while the decision maker always has the basic need to absolutely grasp the intelligence community.In some specific cases,powerful intelligence agencies may have the ability to shape decision-making,or even erode some decision-making power.However,policymakers rely on intelligence work,but as the master of power and the helm of the country,policymakers will also influence the intelligence community for political considerations,or proceed from political considerations to decide whether to recognize the results of intelligence work.Therefore,the intelligence work will be interfered by the decision makers,and will also be influenced by the subjectivity of the intelligence agencies themselves,differences of opinions among intelligence agencies,and various political and interactive relations.These effects often lead to the mistakes of the intelligence work.The farce of "missile gap panic" half a century ago proves this point indisputably.In general,the mistakes of American strategic intelligence work during the "missile gap" period can provide some lessons for our strategic intelligence work.From the error of American strategic intelligence work in the period of "missile gap",instrumental nature is the natural character of intelligence work.Regardless of the influence of intelligence work on decision-making,intelligence work is only a part of the scope of decision-making.In order to make scientific and reasonable decision-making,intelligence agencies should provide objective information products to decision-makers as far as possible,instead of shaping and eroding decision-making power according to the subjective factors of intelligence agencies.At the same time,while policymakers have the power to regulate the intelligence community,they should not interfere too much with their intelligence work. |
