| Property right system is the cornerstone of market economy.Property rights protection is the premise to ensure equal participation and fair competition of market subjects.Only when property rights are scientifically defined and effectively protected,can we form a good credit environment and market order,ensure the healthy operation of the market mechanism,and then give full play to the decisive role of the market in the allocation of resources;Only in this way can market players form reasonable expectations,enhance the motivation for entrepreneurship and innovation,thus forming a vivid situation of mass entrepreneurship and innovation,and starting a new engine of economic development.To this end,it is emphasized to strengthen the protection of property rights.Since the reform and opening up,by vigorously promoting the reform of the property right system,China has basically formed a modern property right system and legal framework for property right protection with clear ownership,clear rights and responsibilities,strict protection and smooth circulation.The awareness of property right protection in the whole society has been continuously strengthened and the protection has been strengthened.However,China’s property right protection system still faces the problems of insufficient protection and injustice: the loss of state-owned assets is serious;The efficiency of property right management and operation of state-owned enterprises is not high;Ownership differential treatment still exists;The protection of non-public economic property rights is not in place;The tax burden of non-state-owned enterprises is too heavy;Weak awareness of intellectual property protection and rights protection,etc.The lack o f fairness of property right protection system directly frustrates the investment and innovation enthusiasm of private enterprises.These problems finally show that the contradiction between the internal needs of economic and social development for property rights protection and the insufficient supply of property rights protection system intensifies,the market vitality is insufficient and the efficiency is low.It has become a shackle on the road of perfecting the socialist market economic system,establishing a modern economic system and promoting high-quality development.We will improve the property rights protection system with fairness as the core principle,ensure that all kinds of ownership economies use production factors equally according to law,participate in market competition openly,fairly and fairly,and receive equal legal protection,which is conducive to consolidating and improving the basic economic system with public ownership as the main body and the common development of various ownership economies,and developing the mixed ownership economy,Improve the efficiency of resource allocation while promoting equity.Therefore,it is emphasized to protect property rights fairly.This thesis first analyzes the connotation and composition of property rights,property rights protection and property rights protection system,then reviews the change history of China’s property rights protection system,and summarizes the forms and characteristics of China’s property rights protection system.The analysis of the current situation of property rights protection shows that the problems of property rights security in China are mainly concentrated in the low level of intellectual property rights protection,while the satisfaction degree of personal safety is relatively high,and the satisfaction degree of property security is in the middle.However,if the level of enterprise property rights protection is defined in a broad sense,it can be found that the level of enterprise property rights protection is low.This shows that the current level of enterprise property right protection in China should not stop at the level of enterprise property right security,but should pay more attention to the protection of enterprise development right in market competition.In addition,the questionnaire results show that entrepreneurs’ social status ranks the highest,followed by economic status and political status.By combing the history of China’s property rights protection system,we can find that China’s property rights protection system is gradually improving,and the attitude towards the property rights of private enterprises has gradually changed from not recognizing to emphasizing fair protection and equal participation in market competition.The formal property right protection system is not implemented in place,and the special property right protection in the form of red hat enterprises and political connections has obvious characteristics of interpersonal transaction,which is the problem of property right protection in China.This part of the research constitutes the first chapter of this thesis.Secondly,this thesis compares and analyzes the impact of universal property right protection system and special property right protection system on the development of private enterprises,and analyzes the impact of political connection,a special property right protection system,on Rent-seeking and rent-setting between government and business through a simple private enterprise local government officials static game.It is considered that the occurrence of rent-seeking and rent-setting should be curbed by reducing political related behavior and increasing supervision and punishment.In addition,the mechanism analysis shows that the fair protection of property rights can promote the performance of private enterprises by promoting the rational allocation of entrepreneurship,reducing institutional transaction costs and alleviating enterprise financing constraints.This part of the research constitutes the second chapter of the thesis.Third,using the 2005 World Bank survey data of Chinese enterprises,this thesis empirically studies the impact of the degree of property protection on the improvement of enterprise performance and the intermediary mechanism of entrepreneur talent allocation.It is found that the improvement of property right protection can significantly promote the improvement of enterprise performance.The full sample regression results show that the degree of property right protection can be increased by one percentage point,and the enterprise productivity can be increased by about 2.7%;The intermediary effect test found that property right protection can indirectly affect the level of enterprise performance through the allocation of differentiated entrepreneurial talents.Specifically,the improvement of property right protection can promote the improvement of enterprise performance by encouraging entrepreneurs to increase productive activities.At the same time,it can inhibit the non productive activities of entrepreneurs.The test results of the whole sample data show that to a certain extent,non productive activities can promote the improvement of enterprise performance,but the quadratic coefficient of non productive activities is significantly negative,which indicates that the impact of non productive activities on enterprise performance is first promoted and then inhibited,that is,the two show an inverted U-shaped relationship;The influence of the degree of property right protection on the level of enterprise performance is heterogeneous: compared with state-owned enterprises,foreign-funded enterprises and large-scale enterprises,private enterprises and small-scale enterprises are more sensitive to the degree of property right protection;Compared with private enterprises with political connections,private enterprises without political connections are more sensitive to the degree of property rights protection.After using instrumental variables to solve endogenous problems and replacing core explanatory variables and samples,the above conclusion is still robust.This part of the research constitutes the third chapter of the thesis.Fourth,theoretical analysis and empirical research in the third chapter find that compared with private enterprises with political connections,private enterprises without political connections are more sensitive to the degree of property rights protection.Therefore,this thesis further empirically analyzes the property rights protection effect of political connections(special property rights protection system)of private enterprises,which constitutes the content of the fourth chapter of this thesis.Specifically: based on the property right protection level of sample private enterprises measured from the perspective of enterprise behavior,it is found that under the same other conditions,entrepreneurs’ political participation in private listed companies can promote the improvement of private property right protection level of private enterprises,and political participation has brought higher property right protection effect to enterprises with higher density of intangible assets;The test results show that both the political association of enterprise representatives and committee members and the political association of government officials have a positive impact on the level of enterprise property right protection;According to the positions of senior executives,the chairman’s political connection and CEO’s political connection have a positive effect on the level of enterprise property rights protection.If the private holding company contains some state-owned equity,the explanation of entrepreneurs’ participation in politics to the improvement of the company’s property right protection level will be significantly weakened;The political connection of participating in politics is not conducive to the improvement of resource allocation efficiency among enterprises,while the impact of political connection of participating in shares on resource allocation among enterprises is uncertain.Fifth,the core of improving the property right protection system is fairness.This part discusses the impact of property right fair protection(universal property right protection system),which constitutes the content of the fifth chapter of this thesis.The property law establishes the principle of equal protection of public and private property,which improves the fairness of property protection.Based on the research in Chapter 4,using the data of Ashare private listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2010,and taking the promulgation of the property law in 2007 as the quasi natural experiment,Using the double difference method(did),this thesis discusses the impact of the improvement of the fairness of property rights protection on the total factor productivity of Chinese private enterprises.It is found that compared with the control group(politically connected)enterprises,the impact brought by the promulgation of the property law leads to the experimental group(no political connection)the total factor productivity of enterprises increased significantly.This conclusion is still valid after using psm＿did to control endogenous problems,replacing the measurement method of core variables,adding provinces,industry fixed effects and using placebo test.The heterogeneity test based on region,industry and enterprise level shows that:(1)Compared with the regions with higher degree of marketization,the enterprises in the regions with lower degree of marketization are relatively more affected by the promulgation of the property law;(2)compared with the industries with higher degree of competition,the enterprises in the industries with lower degree of competition are relatively more affected by the promulgation of the property law;(3)Compared with industries with low density of intangible assets,enterprises in industries with high density of intangible assets are relatively more affected by the promulgation of the property law;(4)compared with large-scale enterprises,small-scale enterprises are affected by the property law The impact of promulgation is relatively greater.Mechanism research shows that fair protection of property rights can promote the improvement of total factor productivity by reducing transaction costs,alleviating financing constraints and improving capital allocation efficiency.In addition,our research results show that the improvement of the fairness of property rights protection characterized by the promulgation of the property law has narrowed the gap between enterprises caused by personalized property rights protection,and provided empirical evidence for developing impersonal transaction relations and promoting fair competition among private enterprises.Sixth,on the basis of the above research,this thesis analyzes the reasons for the lack of property rights protection and the resistance of system reform from the aspects of formal system and its implementation,universal property rights and special property rights,bazel’s property rights protection theory and so on.It is considered that under the order of limited rights,the fairness of China’s property right protection system is insufficient.The key to solve this problem is to restrict the power of the government,strengthen supervision,change from limited access order to open access order,change from special property right system to universal property right system,and combine the decisive role of the market in resource allocation with the role of the government,Strengthen the construction of the rule of law and develop impersonal trading relations.In comprehensively deepening the reform,first,actively promote theoretical innovation,correctly understand the logical unity of protecting private property rights and common prosperity,and gather public awareness of respecting property rights,especially private property rights.Second,reform the legal system,comprehensively protect the property rights of various forms and functions,completely and equally protect the property rights of various ownership attributes,especially in the constitutional field,we should eliminate the ownership discrimination against private property rights. |
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