Mechanism Design In Prevention Incentives For Healthcare Providers And Demanders Under Information Asymmetry

Increasing healthcare expenditure has given enormous financial pressure on governments,health providers and demanders.Prevention has gradually become more widely used as a way of reducing costs in health management.However,in reality,prevention is often not as effective as it could be.One of the major reasons is the lack of incentives for the participants involved in prevention services.In addition,the existence of the demander’s information advantage makes it difficult for the government and health providers to accurately obtain their true private information and thus formulate relevant policies.Therefore,to solve the above problem and enhance the prevention utility,based on mechanism design theory,this paper gives corresponding incentive policies and instruments for prevention services in different situations in order to enhance the efficiency of prevention.First,this paper classifies the preventive management in different situations.The demands of the agents,their structure and operation mode are also analyzed in each situation.Based on the analysis,a multi-agent benefit model on mechanism design theory is given.Through the construction of individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints,the evaluation of the prevention and incentive system is improved.A closed-loop system of demand explicit-model improvement-rationality test is created,and the difficult to get private information is solved.Then,based on whether the health providers have an incentive to prevent,this paper divides the study into two parts: the provider-leads of prevention incentive design and the government-lead of prevention incentive design.In the provider-led prevention incentive design,according to the actual situation,the design of health insurance package for customers carrying genetic disease genes is studied.In the design of government-led prevention incentives,the design of mechanisms for conventional chronic diseases and sudden-onset infectious diseases are studied separately.In the management of genetic diseases prevention,the health demanders are customer groups with high genetic risk and possessing heterogeneous private information.To prevent them from transferring risks to the health system through information advantages,an insurance package plan that combined with different prices and services according to the contract design theory is given.On the premise of unavailable to their private information,the proposed insurance package guides customers to choose the most suitable plan,and ultimately achieve the maximum utility of the health system.The designed mechanism unifies the interests of all parties,urges all parties to cooperate sincerely,and eliminates the motives of high-risk individuals for fraud and concealment.In the management of chronic disease prevention,the lack of enthusiasm for prevention on both the supply and demand sides of health services is considered.Based on the mechanism design theory,on the premise of ensuring that the demanders of preventive services use real information,the original fixed subsidy is subdivided to improves the supply and demand of preventive services.At the same time,the primary medical agent’s right to use the surplus subsidy is adjusted,which improves the prevention enthusiasm of both the supply and demand sides of health services,and increased the ultimate utility of each subject.In the management of sudden-onset infectious diseases prevention,the target of maintaining the operation of health service providers and attracting more health service demanders to participate in the prevention is considered.The mechanism design theory is adopted to design a subsidy and punishment mechanism for both the supply and demand sides of health services.And the final verification is given to the utility of the proposed mechanism in this paper.The designed mechanism has positive network utility,that is,as the number of participants increases,the utility of each agent increases.Therefore,the government can achieve the goal of increasing overall utility by encouraging individual friends to recommend forms of prevention.This paper uses mechanism design theory to align the interests of the subjects involved in prevention through the use of incentive rules,so that the subject with the advantage of information can spontaneously report truthful private information,which can effectively solve the problem of information concealment.At the same time,the given incentive rules activate the prevention participants and enhance the prevention efficiency.Theoretically,the research in this paper provides a rich background for mechanism design theory,and provides a basis for further deepening and improving mechanism design theory.In practice,the relevant findings of this paper have been translated into management recommendations to help governments and healthcare organizations make better decisions in similar settings.