Optimum Research On Pricing Of Carriers And Subsidies From The Government In Three Gorges Shipping Hub

With the rapid growth of vessel traffic flow through Three Gorges Hub,insufficient capacity of locks is becoming increasingly prominent,which causes great pressure on navigation efficiency and navigation safety.In particular,the congestion of vessel traffic flow in the emergency situation is aggravated,which makes the transshipment transportation becoming normal.Since the South Transshipment Highway opened to traffic in 2010,few Ro-on/off and container carriers suitable for transshipment were reluctant to adopt this mode due to high transit cost.In addition,the government wants to quickly evacuate the vessel traffic flow to improve navigation safety and crisis response capabilities.This paper carries out a systematic and in-depth study on the game between carrier’s pricing and government subsidies.The main work are as follows:(1)To find a balanced strategy between the carrier’s behavior of the transshipment and government subsidies.By constructing an evolutionary game model,this paper discusses the game mechanism between transshipment transportation strategy and government subsidies,and analyzes the equilibrium point between the transshipment transportation strategy implemented by heterogeneous carriers and government subsidies under different scenarios,so as to maximize the benefits of both sides.We found that in the emergency state,when water-railway transport is adopted on RO-RO ships,the government did not need to give subsidies,and the carrier could obtain greater benefits through transshipment mode,which met the situation in Scenario 3.In other cases,if the carrier adopted the lockage mode and the government did not give subsidies,both sides could get greater benefits;while the government wanted to take measures to ease the congestion in front of the Three Gorges hub,different amounts of subsidies should be provided,in this case,the carrier would turn to the transshipment.(2)To explore the carrier’s optimal pricing decision under the condition of anarchic subsidy Based on the prospect theory,utility theory and inertia behavior,this paper constructed two heterogeneous carrier and shipper choice behavior models,analyzed the psychological characteristics of the carrier and shipper and the inflexion point of the choice behavior of different transportation modes,and explored the optimal pricing decision of the carrier under the condition of non-government subsidies.We found that under emergency circumstances,the carrier behaved rational and more sensible to adopt transshipment.Under non-emergency circumstances,carriers should adopt lockage mode to maximize benefits;if the inertia behavior of the shipper was increasing to incur the prolonging wait cost,the carrier will raise the transportation price to offset this part of cost;under non-emergency and emergency states,when the pass-through rate reaches a certain threshold,the transport pricing of RO/RO and container carriers remains stable,indicating that the probability of secondary selection will not have a relatively large impact on the transport pricing of carriers.(3)To find the optimal subsidy from the government and the optimal transshipment pricing of carriers under the multi-agent participation.Based on the utility theory,pricing theory and differential pricing strategy,considering the shipper subsidy mechanism and carrier subsidy mechanism,this paper establishes social welfare function and differential compensation strategy models with the consideration of environmental awareness,finds out the optimal subsidy and optimal freight rate equilibrium strategy,and explores the preconditions for government subsidy to produce positive promoting effect.It is found that from the perspective of cost subsidy,shipper subsidy mechanism can improve the carrier’s transportation pricing,carrier subsidy mechanism can reduce the carrier’s transportation pricing,and improve social welfare and carriers’ benefit.When the subsidy exceeds a certain threshold,it can effectively improve the social welfare and carriers benefit.From the point of view of price subsidy,the compensation for the carrier is more helpful to stabilize the carrier’s transport pricing,but the income of different carriers shows different trends,such as the income of container carriers with the increase of the amount of compensation for the difference increases.Under emergency states,if the carrier implements the rapid response strategy,it is necessary to increase the freight rate to obtain higher revenue and offset the cost caused by the dam-tipping mode of transportation.(4)To explore the improvement effect of different subsidies on the competitiveness of transshipment transportation.Considering that the shipper is sensitive to congestion,and the carrier participates in the investment of the dam-turning transportation system,the profit models with shippers’ subsidy and carriers’ subsidy mechanisms under the competitive and cooperative strategies are constructed.Considering the secondary choice of the carrier and the transport capacity of the land carrier,the competitiveness index model based on the penalty function is established to explore the effectiveness of government subsidies in improving the transport rate over the dam.It is found that when the shipper is subsidized,the pass-through rate increases with the increase of the subsidy,while when the carrier is subsidized,the pass-through rate decreases with the increase of the subsidy.When the service level and government subsidies are improved,the shipper can be subsidized to increase the dam-tipping transportation rate.When considering the transport capacity of land carriers and the penalty cost,the government subsidy can effectively improve the competitiveness of dam-turning transportation.