Research On Cross Regional Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism

The basin ecological compensation mechanism is an effective channel to achieve the goal of “green water and green mountains are golden mountains and silver mountains”.It is not only conducive to protecting the ecological environment,but also provides important support and guarantee for economic and social development.As a typical spillover quasi ecological product,water resources are characterized by unclear rights and responsibilities in the supply and demand link,so the government needs to assume the rights and responsibilities of compensation or claim.However,the government’s efforts to control water pollution in river basins involve the interests of multiple regions and entities,and the division of regional jurisdiction can easily lead to issues such as “free riding” and “tragedy of commons”.Therefore,how to establish and improve a cross regional ecological compensation mechanism,and how to balance the costs and benefits between different regions and stakeholders in the process of cross egional water pollution collaborative governance,are urgent issues to be solved in watershed ecological compensation.Based on it,this study follows the logical mainline of “decision-making of behavior subjects-establishment of compensation standards-construction of incentive mechanisms”.By defining the central government,upstream and downstream local governments,and various stakeholders of the public,a cross regional basin ecological compensation framework is proposed,and public willingness is integrated into the compensation policy formulation and optimization process to break through the current difficulties of cross regional basin compensation.The main tasks are as follows:(1)Research on the evolution of ecological compensation subjects in cross-regional river basins.The four main stakeholders in environmental governance,namely the central government,upstream government,downstream government,and public,were placed under a unified framework.A four-party evolutionary game model was established,and numerical simulation was used to simulate the impact of parameter changes on the stability strategies of different stakeholders in the game system.The optimal strategy and constraint conditions for establishing ecological compensation were analyzed.It is shown that when the four conditions─ the central government’s daily supervision,upstream government protection,downstream government compensation and public participation─ are met,there is a stable and balanced solution.The higher the supervision cost,the longer it takes the central government and downstream governments to choose the daily supervision and compensation strategy.When the central government increases the punishment to the downstream government,it is helpful to establish the ecological compensation mechanism of the trans-regional basin.The amount of ecological compensation has a significant impact on the downstream government ’ s participation in ecological compensation behavior,and its impact on the upstream government and the central government is opposite.The allocation ratio significantly affects the decision-making of the downstream government.(2)Research on the determination of ecological compensation standards for cross regional river basins.This section proposes a method for calculating the upper and lower limits of ecological compensation standards for cross regional watersheds.The conditional value method is used to calculate the public payment level in the downstream of the watershed as the lower limit of the compensation standard,and the ecosystem service value method is used to calculate the upper limit of the compensation standard,thereby determining the threshold of ecological compensation standards.Using the Rubinstein Starr bargaining model,specific compensation standards are determined through negotiations between upstream and downstream governments and the mechanism of collaborative evolution among different stakeholders is determined.The feasibility of proposing an ecological compensation mechanism in this study is verified by taking Henan Shandong provinces in the Yellow River Basin as examples.Research has found that the public in Shandong Province is willing to pay1.83 billion yuan in ecological compensation funds to Henan Province as the lower limit of the ecological compensation standard,and the value of Shandong’s ecological services overflowing from Henan waters is 6.54 billion yuan as the upper limit of the ecological compensation standard.Ultimately,it is determined that there exists a dynamic game process between ecological protectors and beneficiaries.The implementation of basin ecological compensation mechanism needs to be based on the enhancement of ecological and environmental awareness among stakeholders within the basin,with the public’s ability to pay and the value of basin ecosystem service functions as the benchmark,and determine reasonable basin ecological compensation standards through the bargaining mechanism of upstream and downstream governments.(3)Research on the incentive mechanism for ecological compensation in cross regional river basins.Based on the multi task principal-agent theory,an incentive model for vertically and horizontally integrated transfer payments is constructed,and a compensation cooperation model for vertically and horizontally integrated transfer payments is established between the central government and the public participation in the upstream and downstream governments of the river basin,in order to explore the optimal incentive contract.Expanding the traditional multi task cost independent function into a multi task cost substitution and complementarity function,exploring the optimal incentive contract model under different cost functions in different states,and analyzing the effects of different parameters on ecological compensation incentives.The results show that there is a positive correlation between the level of ecological protection efforts and the incentive coefficient of vertical and horizontal transfer payment under the cooperative state of local governments.The cost correlation coefficient determines the relationship between effort degree and task incentive coefficient in the state of local government cooperation.After public evaluation being introduced,the effort level of local government for ecological development and economic development tasks is positively correlated with the public evaluation coefficient,while the incentive coefficient of ecological development is negatively correlated with the public evaluation coefficient.The main contribution of this study is to construct an evolutionary game system composed of upstream government,downstream government,central government,and the public.It proposes a bargaining negotiation method for the upper and lower limits of ecological compensation in cross regional river basins,and establishes a multi-objective task driven incentive mechanism for ecological compensation between upstream and downstream agents in the basin.In addition,taking the Yellow River Basin as an example to explore the decision-making of cross basin ecological compensation behavior entities,the establishment of compensation standards,and the construction of incentive methods have important demonstration effects on the current ecological compensation issues in the basin,and also have good reference significance for the construction of cross regional ecological compensation mechanisms in various regions.