Research On China’s Diversified Payments For Ecosystem Services

Building an ecological civilization is fundamental to the sustainable development of the Chinese nation.Since the 18 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China(CPC),China has been promoting ecological progress with unprecedented strength and determination.As an important part of the construction of ecological civilization system,the ecological protection compensation system has been given new requirements for institutional construction.In order to fully interpret the environmental protection concept of "lucidwaters and lush mountains are gold and silver mountains",it will overcome the problem of "environmental protection is not economical,and economy is not environmental protection" through the transformation of ecological value,protection cost and development opportunity.Thus,the effective development of national environmental protection work and the overall improvement of environmental quality will be realized.In addition,the diversified forms of ecological protection compensation system provide differentiated solutions to the complex problems of China’s environmental governance,making it possible to "protect in development and develop in protection".Therefore,the study of China’s diversified ecological protection compensation system is not only of great significance to the construction of China’s ecological civilization system,but also crucially provides direction guidance for promoting the construction of a beautiful China and realizing the modernization of harmonious coexistence between man and nature.As early as 2005,China’s ecological protection compensation system has been gradually implemented,and in May 2016,the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and The General Office of the State Council issued the Opinions on Improving the Ecological Protection Compensation Mechanism(State Affairs and Development Bureau(2016)No.31),which proposed the top-level design plan of the system at the national level for the first time.So far,the compensation system has achieved positive results.However,at the same time,the current compensation system for ecological protection still fails to deal with the problems such as pollution aggravation caused by spatial spillover,governance dilemma caused by transboundary pollution,and behavior alienation caused by multi-objective conflicts,which still restrict the performance of the system.Based on the background of institutional development,this paper innovatively constructs China’s diversified ecological protection compensation system and its analysis framework.On this basis,this paper also puts forward the comprehensive optimization scheme and key optimization measures of China’s diversified ecological protection compensation system.In this regard,this paper mainly does the following work and obtains some main conclusions:Firstly,this paper constructs China’s diversified ecological protection compensation system from three key contents: forming ideas,characteristic analysis and overall framework.Combined with the operation logic of the system,this paper proposes the analysis framework of "relationship-behavior-performance"(RCP).It is found that China’s ecological protection compensation system is the product of the new requirements of national governance and the new form of environmental protection.According to the pollution spillover situation and the status of ecological property rights,it can be further divided into three categories: market-oriented ecological protection compensation system,horizontal ecological protection compensation system between local governments,and vertical ecological protection compensation system between central and local governments.As for the market-oriented ecological protection compensation system,the unique incentive mechanism and rich financing mechanism are its important features,which make the system have the operational advantage of regulating the environmental protection behavior of participants through market prices.As for the horizontal ecological protection compensation system,it mainly solves the problem of one-way pollution spillover.The compensator and the compensated can negotiate the compensation standard,compensation form,regulatory rules,etc.,which is the direct manifestation of the trans-boundary cooperative pollution control mode.As for the vertical ecological protection compensation system,it can solve the problem of multi-directional pollution spillover,and there is an administrative subordinate relationship between the compensator and the compensated,which makes the ecological compensation fund actually have the characteristics of general transfer payment in the environmental field.Combined with the characteristics of the above three types of compensation systems,since the implementation of different types of compensation systems involves the relationship development and behavior change of the participants as well as the system implementation performance,we put forward the "relationship-behavior-performance"(RCP)analysis framework,which builds a unified theoretical framework for the analysis of the operation logic of specific compensation systems in the following chapters.Secondly,compared with the non-market-based compensation system for ecological protection,this system has the "dual" mechanism of government guidance and market regulation,but the existing research has not presented a complete action path.Therefore,taking China’s carbon trading system as an example,this paper focuses on the realistic development,operation logic and influence mechanism of the marketbased ecological protection compensation system.The results show that: 1)With the proposal of China’s "dual carbon" goal,China’s carbon trading system has entered a stage of rapid development,but there are still some problems in the quota management and trading degree in this stage.2)The implementation of the carbon trading system can form an influence path of "government-market relationship(R)-micro enterprise behavior(C)-carbon emission level(P)",and find the balance point of the system from the government intervention and market operation to influence the choice of environmental protection behavior of micro enterprises,thus reducing the overall carbon emission level.3)The implementation of the carbon trading system can effectively reduce the level of carbon emissions,and the market mechanism can fully mobilize the enthusiasm of enterprises’ environmental information disclosure behavior,and exert constraints,incentives and supervision on enterprises’ emission reduction behavior.This effect is more obvious when the trading activity of the carbon trading market is high.Thirdly,this paper studies the horizontal ecological protection compensation system among local governments from four parts: research necessity,typical cases,operation logic and empirical analysis.The systematic analysis shows that: 1)Based on the representative case of horizontal ecological protection compensation system--ecological compensation in the Xin ’an River Basin of Anhui and Zhejiang Province,the analysis found that there are still some problems in this system,such as imperfect coordination mechanism,insufficient incentive effect,lack of systematic legal constraints and real-time supervision.2)The implementation of the system will form a collaborative governance relationship between local governments,so that the principal can influence the environmental protection behavior of the agent through mutual supervision,behavioral constraints and institutional incentives,and then produce the effect of ecological environment improvement.3)The empirical analysis shows that the compensation system is not simply financial compensation,but more importantly,through the adjustment of compensation coefficient in the contract design,it can form constraints,incentives and supervision on the environmental protection behavior of the participants.Therefore,we use the moral hazard model to screen out the influence factors for the contract design of the compensation system,which provides basic principles for the subsequent optimization scheme formulation.Finally,this paper designs four parts: research necessity,typical cases,operation logic and empirical analysis.Starting from the problem of multi-task conflict,this paper studies the vertical ecological protection compensation system between central and local governments around the behavior of local governments.The systematic analysis shows that: 1)Based on the representative case of the vertical ecological protection compensation system--the transfer payment of national Key ecological function zone,the analysis found that there is indeed a lot of experience in the implementation of the system,but there is still room for improvement of the system.2)The relationship between central and local governments formed by the system can effectively affect the behavior choice of local governments,resulting in institutional constraints and incentives,and then affect the implementation performance of the system.3)Empirical analysis shows that when local governments are faced with multi-task goal conflicts,the central government can design incentive contracts to improve the effectiveness of compensation system.We also screen the influence factors for contract design based on the multi-task principal-agent model,which also proves that in this case,the principal can choose multiple agents to carry out task agency,which can not only improve the efficiency but also reduce the cost of delegation.This study shows that marketization,horizontal and vertical ecological protection compensation systems constitute China’s diversified ecological protection compensation system.Different types of compensation systems can better solve the problems of spatial spillover,transboundary pollution and multi-objective conflict in China’s environmental governance,which reveals that China’s diversified ecological protection system is systematic,complex and long-term.Combined with the above research conclusions,this paper focuses on the comprehensive optimization scheme and key optimization measures,trying to integrate the governance concept into the whole process of the implementation of the ecological protection compensation system,and establish the whole process management system of "restraint in advance,incentive in the event,and supervision after the event".