Since the reform and opening up,China’s economic development level has been continuously improved,and the problem of environmental pollution has also followed.As an important means to solve the contradiction between economic growth and environmental protection.Environmental regulation includes "supervising enterprises" environmental regulation focusing on supervising enterprises and "supervising government" environmental regulation focusing on supervising the government.With the continuous victory of China’s pollution prevention and control battle,the space for emission reduction will be smaller and smaller in the future.Relying only on "supervising enterprises" environmental regulation can not solve the development and environmental constraints faced by Chinese enterprises.Therefore,in recent years,"supervising government" environmental regulation has become a key regulatory policy to promote the high-quality development of micro enterprises and macroeconomy.Starting from the "supervising government" environmental regulation,this study combs the institutional background and implementation of "supervising government" environmental regulation,such as environmental target responsibility system,central environmental protection inspection system,environmental protection interview,environmental protection planning and so on.Based on the evolutionary game model,this paper analyzes the strategic choice of local government and enterprise behavior under the "supervising government" environmental regulation.The enterprise behavior is divided into production behavior and environmental behavior,and the micro enterprise data are used to empirically test the effect and mechanism of "supervising government" environmental regulation on enterprise emission reduction behavior,green innovation behavior,environmental investment behavior,entry and exit behavior,as well as the differential effect of "supervising government" environmental regulation under different enterprise life cycles.Combined with the conclusions of theoretical and empirical analysis,from the perspective of different subjects such as government and enterprises,this paper puts forward policy suggestions to further improve the effect of "supervising government" environmental regulation and realize the high-quality development of enterprises.The study of evolutionary game model shows that when enterprises choose production and environmental behavior,resulting in high emission reduction costs,enterprises do not reduce emissions regardless of the level of environmental regulation.Only the cost of emission reduction is reduced to a low level,its strategy choice is affected by the strategy choice of local government.The stronger the environmental regulation,the more enterprises tend to choose pollution control and emission reduction.From the empirical study,we found that the emission intensity of water pollution and air pollution was reduced by the use of clean energy and pollution treatment facilities under the environmental protection target responsibility system,and achieved total emission reduction.The intensity of environmental administrative punishment and environmental protection subsidies for enterprises was increased by the central environmental protection inspector,so as to the level of green innovation of enterprises was improved.The role of environmental administrative punishment in promoting environmental protection investment of enterprises was strengthened by environmental interview.The entry and exit of enterprises from the market was accelerated by the environmental protection plan.Also,the distribution of enterprise scale was promoted and the economic distortion was alleviated.Under the "supervising government" environmental regulation,local governments should strive to promote enterprises to use clean energy,install pollution control facilities,improve green innovation,increase environmental protection investment,speed up entry and exit,help pollution control and emission reduction,and realize highquality development of enterprises. |