Incentive Contract Model And Simulation Of Green Certificate Market Subjects Considering Collective Action

Renewable Portfolio Standards(RPS)is a mandatory institutional change for China to achieve the goal of carbon peak and carbon neutrality and low-carbon energy transformation.On the one hand,the green certificate trading based on the RPS is conducive to the internalization of the production externalities of power generation manufacturers through the market by relying on the tradable green certificates(TGC).On the other hand,it is conducive to the mechanism design and parameter design based on the TGC system,and the internalization of the production externalities of power generation manufacturers through the institutional approach.On October 24,2022,the National Energy Administration issued the Notice on soliciting and Improving the Renewable Energy Green Power Certificate System,which noted that the green certificate is the only proof of the environmental attributes of renewable energy in China,and the only green certificate to identify the production and consumption of renewable energy power.At present,there are some problems in China’s voluntary TGC trading,such as price without market,price distortion and lack of market liquidity.Therefore,scientifically promoting mandatory TGC trading has important theoretical and practical reference value for effectively improving the institutional performance level of the TGC system.After implementing mandatory TGC trading,market participants with similar interests will form interest groups and attempt to enhance the public interest of the group through collective action.The collective action formed by the main body of the TGC market and its interaction with the system will determine the efficiency of the TGC market and the direction of institutional change.In collective action,the heterogeneous preferences and strategic behavior of market participants will affect the formation and evolution of collective action,especially the free riding behavior of self-interested individuals.This not only weakens the enthusiasm of other participants to participate in collective action,but also creates collective action dilemmas.The scientific incentive contract design for green certificate market participants can effectively incentivize heterogeneous market participants to participate in the TGC trading,avoid self-interested free riding behavior,and promote the formation of collective actions,thereby improving the efficiency of collective actions.Based on the consideration of the above issues,this article analyzes the formation and evolution of collective actions of green certificate market participants based on collective action theory and incentive contract theory.Market participants incentive contract model considering collective action.is constructed,and based on this,simulation research is conducted on the impact of incentive contract design on the efficiency of collective action of green certificate market participants.The main research work of this paper is as follows:(1)Based on the collective action theory and institutional economics,the formation and evolution of the collective action of green certificate market participants were studied.Firstly,this paper analyzed the influence mechanism of TGC system on the collective action of market participants,and analyzed the symbiotic evolution process of the two.On this basis,the collective action of green certificate market participants was defined.Secondly,by constructing game equilibrium model and evolutionary game model,this paper explored the formation and evolution of collective action of market participants with heterogeneous preferences,and analyzed the evolutionary mechanism,evolutionary path and evolutionary equilibrium of collective action.Finally,according to the results of the evolutionary equilibrium of the collective action of market participants,the institutional implications of collective action dilemma and collective action efficiency were explained.(2)The incentive contract model of green certificate market participants action hiding considering collective action was constructed.Firstly,based on the moral hazard problem that leads to the collective action dilemma,this paper clarified the influence path of action hidden incentive contract on the collective action of market participants,and designed the contract time sequence,assumption conditions and components of action hidden incentive contract.Secondly,the symmetric information incentive contract model with observable actions and the asymmetric information incentive contract model with unobservable actions were constructed,and the optimal solutions of the two incentive contract models were statically analyzed.Finally,the influence of key incentive contract parameters on the performance of incentive contracts was deconstructed by constructing a Stackelberg game model.(3)The incentive contract model of green certificate market participants’ preference hiding considering collective action was constructed.Firstly,based on the adverse selection problem that leads to the collective action dilemma,the influence path of the incentive contract with hidden preference on the collective action of market participants was clarified,and the incentive contract with hidden preference was designed.Secondly,the symmetric information incentive contract model with observable preference and the asymmetric information incentive contract model with unobservable preference were constructed,and the optimal solutions of the two incentive contract models were statically analyzed.Finally,the influence of key incentive contract parameters on the performance of incentive contracts was deconstructed.(4)Simulation of incentive contract model based on multi-agent and system dynamics model was realized.Firstly,the simulation subject and simulation environment of incentive contract model were designed by using multi-agent method.Secondly,the behavioral interaction process of green certificate market participants participating in the contract relationship was described by multi-agent,and the market transaction process of market participants participating in the TGC transaction was described by system dynamics model.Finally,Netlogo simulation platform was used to dynamically simulate the incentive effects of action hidden incentive contract and preference hidden incentive contract,and the sensitivity analysis of key incentive contract parameters was carried out.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)The preference heterogeneity of green certificate market participants is an important factor affecting the success of collective action.The higher the proportion of self-interested individuals in the group is,the more likely the collective action is to fall into the dilemma of multiple equilibria,resulting in the low efficiency of collective action.(2)When the action of green certificate market participants cannot be observed,there is a unique optimal solution to the incentive contract.After the implementation of the optimal incentive contract,the supply and demand of TGCs increase,and the government’s utility level increases.This shows that the incentive contract can effectively encourage market participants to participate in TGC trading,and it is feasible.(3)When both self-interested and altruistic participants participate in the asymmetric information incentive contract with hidden preferences,the incentive contract is confused for the quota subject group,and the type of quota subject cannot be identified by the incentive contract.When only a single type of market participants participates in the incentive contract,there is a unique optimal solution to the incentive contract,and the type of market subject can be effectively identified,it is the altruistic group.After the implementation of the optimal incentive contract,the supply and demand of TGCs increase,and the government’s utility level increases,which promotes the market participants to actively participate in the TGC transaction.(4)The incentive contract model considering collective action designed in this paper can effectively encourage market participants to participate in collective action,smooth the fluctuation of TGC price,increase the expected supply and demand quantity and trading volume of TGC,and improve the profit level of market subjects and the liquidity of TGC market.The incentive contract parameters such as the benchmark price of green certificates,unit penalty,issuance costs,quotas,and feed-in tariffs have important impacts on the collective actions of market participants.The main innovations of this paper are as follows:(1)Innovatively applying collective action theory and incentive contract theory to the research of the TGC system.(2)Constructed a game equilibrium model for the collective action formation of green certificate market participants and a dynamic game model for the evolution of collective action.(3)Green certificate market participants incentive contract model considering collective action was constructed.(4)Simulation model of incentive contracts for green certificate market participants was constructed.