Non-state-owned Directors' Governance Enthusiasm And Soe Asset Preservation And Appreciation

State-owned enterprises are the backbone of promoting the high-quality development of China's economy,and maintaining and increasing the value of assets is the primary responsibility of state-owned enterprises.The main content of comprehensively deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises in the new era is the reform of mixed ownership,and the primary goal is to maintain and increase the value of state-owned enterprise assets.Therefore,it is of great value to explore how state-owned enterprises can carry out mixed ownership reform in order to more effectively achieve the goal of maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned enterprises' assets.The mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises includes not only the reasonable arrangement of the shareholding ratio of non-state-owned shareholders,but also the reasonable arrangement of the proportion of control rights of non-state-owned shareholders and the effective exercise of their powers.Although the reasonable arrangement of the ownership structure of mixed ownership is the foundation of the governance of mixed ownership enterprises,because the board of directors is the center of the company's decision-making and control,the reasonable arrangement and exercise of the control rights of non-state-owned shareholders in mixed ownership enterprises is the key to realizing the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.The key to the primary goal.Among them,the exercise of control rights is the main point and main performance of non-state-owned shareholders to participate in the governance of state-owned enterprises in mixed-ownership reform,and its impact on the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprise assets is a very important issue that has not yet been studied in the literature.First of all,the main way for non-state-owned shareholders to exercise their control rights is to appoint directors to the board of directors of state-owned enterprises in the mixed-ownership reform and to vote rationally.Voting,especially non-yes voting,can best reflect the enthusiasm of non-state-owned directors to participate in the governance of state-owned enterprises in the mixed-ownership reform.Therefore,whether non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm,i.e.voting non-yes,is rational,and whether it is indeed conducive to improving the governance level of state-owned enterprises,and thus promoting the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises' assets,has become an urgent problem to be studied.This is of great significance for state-owned enterprises to formulate and implement effective mixed-ownership reform plans,further achieve a "reform mechanism" on the basis of "mixed capital",and promote asset preservation and appreciation.Secondly,the governance effect of non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm stems from the governance power they possess.The governance power of non-state-owned directors is mainly reflected in three aspects:governance power base,governance power allocation and governance power coordination.Therefore,a systematic study of non-state-owned directors' governance power The influence of characteristics on the governance effect of their voting behavior is of great significance for non-state-owned directors to reasonably use the power of "voting by hand" and non-state-owned shareholders to scientifically participate in the governance of state-owned enterprises in the mixed reform.Finally,the active governance effect of non-state-owned directors also depends on the external governance environment of mixed-ownership enterprises,including various government governance mechanisms and market governance mechanisms.Therefore,it is necessary to study the impact of these two external governance mechanisms on the relationship between non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm and the value preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises' assets.Reform and maximizing the realization of reform goals are also of great significance.Based on this,this paper selects the 2013-2020 China Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share commercial state-owned listed companies as a research sample,and uses the board voting behavior of non-state-owned directors(specifically refers to non-approval voting behavior)to represent their governance enthusiasm.First,with the core theoretical support of property rights theory,information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory and state-owned enterprise reform theory,it analyzes and demonstrates the influence of non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm on the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned enterprises' assets,and from reducing agency costs,alleviating information asymmetry and improving decision-making effectiveness,etc.From the perspective of investor protection at the company level,we investigate the formation mechanism of the influence of non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm on the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned enterprises' assets.Then,with property rights theory,information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory as the core theoretical support,from three aspects of governance power including the basis of governance power(equity mix and control balance),governance power allocation(allocation concentration and allocation equivalence),governance power synergy(internal synergy and external synergy),it analyzes the moderating effect of governance power characteristics on basic relations.Finally,with the property rights theory,information asymmetry theory and market theory as the core theoretical support,considering the interactive influence of the external governance mechanism and the company's internal governance mechanism,it analyzes the moderating effect on the basic relationship,which includes the two government governance mechanisms such as state-owned assets supervision and state audit,as well as four market governance mechanisms such as social audit,market competition,media attention and analyst attention.The study found that:(1)The improvement of non-state-owned directors' enthusiasm for governance can effectively promote the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises' assets,and reduce agency costs,alleviate information asymmetry,and improve decision-making effectiveness.From the perspective of protection,the enthusiasm of non-state-owned directors in governance can replace the lack of investor protection at the company level and promote the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprise assets,that is,the voting behavior of non-state-owned directors on the board of directors is rational.(2)From the perspective of governance power base,with the increase of the degree of equity mixing and the degree of balance of control rights,the promotion effect of non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm on the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises' assets will increase;from the perspective of governance power allocation,with the increase of allocation concentration With the improvement of allocation equivalence,the promotion effect of non-state-owned directors ' governance enthusiasm on the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned enterprise assets will be strengthened;from the perspective of governance power coordination,compared with no internal coordination and external coordination,it has internal coordination and external coordination.Synergy will strengthen the promotion effect of non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm on the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned enterprise assets.(3)From the perspective of the government governance mechanism,compared to the state-owned assets supervision that managed people,affairs and assets in the past,and those that were not audited by the state,the current state-owned assets supervision that mainly manages capital and state-owned enterprises that are audited by the state,non-state-owned directors' enthusiasm for governance has a negative impact on the government.The promotion effect of state-owned enterprise asset preservation and appreciation is stronger;from the perspective of market governance mechanism,compared with state-owned enterprises that have been audited by the non-international "Big Four" society,the non-state-owned directors' enthusiasm for governance has a greater impact on state-owned enterprises.The promotion effect of asset value preservation and appreciation is stronger.At the same time,the increase of product market competition,media attention and analysts' attention will strengthen the promotion effect of non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm on state-owned enterprises' asset value preservation and appreciation.The main theoretical innovations of this paper are:(1)Based on the decision-making perspective of the board of directors,this paper studies the relationship between the enthusiasm of non-state-owned directors and the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned enterprise assets and its formation mechanism,and promotes the research on mixed ownership reform,that is,from "mixed capital" to"mixed capital".The "reform mechanism" has opened the black box of the role of personnel appointed by non-state-owned shareholders,expanded the research on the factors affecting the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned enterprises' assets,and innovated the research on the economic consequences of non-state-owned shareholders' participation in the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises and directors' voting behavior.(2)From the three aspects of governance power base,governance power allocation,and governance power coordination,study the moderating effect of governance power characteristics on the relationship between non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm and state-owned enterprise asset value preservation and appreciation,revealing that non-state-owned directors pass "hand voting"."The inherent logic of participating in the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises helps to form a theoretical analysis framework that integrates the ownership structure,the control structure and the governance behavior of delegated personnel,and enriches the research on the economic consequences of non-state-owned shareholders participating in the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and directors' voting behavior..(3)From the two aspects of government governance mechanism and market governance mechanism,study the moderating effect of external governance mechanism on the relationship between non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm and state-owned enterprise asset value preservation and appreciation,and reform the internal governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises-non-state-owned directors' governance enthusiasm Incorporating the external governance mechanism into the same framework for analysis and research broadens the analytical framework for non-state-owned shareholders to participate in the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,and enriches the research on the interaction and influence of the external governance mechanism and the company's internal governance mechanism.The main practical significance includes:(1)It is helpful for state-owned enterprises to continuously optimize the governance mechanism on the basis of scientifically designing the equity structure of mixed-ownership enterprises to realize "mixed capital",and to protect the rights of non-state-owned shareholders to nominate and appoint directors in accordance with the law,establish a board of directors with active participation and efficient decision-making by all parties,so as to give full play to the governance role of non-state-owned directors,truly realize the "reform mechanism",and ultimately promote state-owned enterprises to become bigger,better and stronger,and promote the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises' assets.(2)It is helpful for non-state-owned shareholders to safeguard their own interests and legitimate benefits based on their equity and control status in the process of participating in the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.The power of“hand voting” can alleviate many disadvantages such as the absence of owners of state-owned enterprises and insider control,and give full play to the functions of decision-making and checks and balances to provide intellectual support.(3)It will help the government to do a good job in the top-level design of the mixed ownership reform,provide ideas for continuing to promote the reform of SOEs,and at the same time,it can also provide the government with a rational use of government and market governance mechanisms to develop a mixed ownership economy and promote the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprise assets.revelation.