Research On The Characteristics Of Board Of Directors & Choice Of Managers In Corporate Governance Of State-enterprises

As an existing form of special enterprises, the state-enterprises are characteristic of modern companies' system. But they are still quite different from the ordinary companies. They are holding a special status and playing a special role in the state economy.Based on the government behaviour and effect of the corporate governance of the state-enterprises, this thesis has analysed the system innovation of the government behavior. The change of government behavior is a game between the government and the social public, a kind of mutual response between the main bodies of all the public behavior. This thesis has formed an utility-function to the governance of the state-enterprises by the government, and formed a controlling model of the government' s utility-function in the corporate governance of the state-enterprises. It has put forward the point that the power of the government is an indispensable condition for the formation of effective property arrangement and the economic development. It has formed a positive directed two-way-expansion model of the government's utility-function, regarding that the government' s utility-function a comprehensive function composed of utility-function of rent-inclination and efficiency-inclination and that its variable structure and variable weight have many stages, which generally starts from rent-inclination to efficiency-inclination and gradually becomes better and better. The thesis has analysed the binary structure of the government' s utility-function. The government' s utility-function can be decomposed of rent-inclination function and efficiency-inclination function. Actually, government' s utility-function is comprehensive, which is coincided with the aboved mentioned utility-functions. The rent-inlination of the government' s utility-function has been stressd ever since the rent-inclination utility function of the government and the managers of the state-enterprises is coincided into the government' s utility-function. The corporate governance of the state-enterprises dominated by the government has strenghthened the substitution of the government' s function by the state-enterprises, thus taking shape of "systematic functional offside" of the state-enterprises.This thesis has analysed the characteristics of the board of directors in the state-enterprises. The scale of the board is negatively related to the management result. The structure of the board has some effect on the quality of its decision. The unstability of the environment and the development of the company are the main variable which affects the variety of the structure of the board. The composition of the board is not much related to the management effect. It is probably an inner vaiable. Efficient system of information network of policy-making can provide a low-cost communication channel, thus improving the efficiency and effect of policy-making and making the governance of the board more workable. Forward nerve-network tranining is a kind of effective supervised study. From the known sample data, we can estimate the relationship between the input and the output, which has a strong capability of function fit. In this thesis a forward nerve-network model is formed on the forward nerve-network training.In the process of corporate govemance of the state-enterprises, it' s very important to choose proper managers. The key problem between the board and the managers is controlling power and extortion. A perfect market of professional managers is advantageous to impel the managers of the state-enterprises to try their uttermost effort. The structure of the income contract may be more beneficial to both the board and the professional managers while providing more measures to the choice and supervision of the professional managers of the stae-enterprises to stablize the effort of the professional managers. On the basis of the comparative effect and the indistinct encouraging mechanism, this thesis has analysed the encouraging mechanism to different managers which is affected by their comparative working result, formed an indistinct choice model based on comparative result comparison. The result of the research reveals that information of comparative result comparision can improve the welfare standard of the managers of the state enterprises so as to impel them to their uttermost effort.In the state-enterprises, the board and the managers have formed a benefit community. But either party has his different target function. The reasonable designed choice mechanism, the board can find qualified managers of the state-enterprises and the managers can achieve their maximum return from their own personnal capital, thus getting the effect of gaming balance of manager choice and a better choice encouraging effect. By behavior supervision, the board may aquire a lot of information related to the state-enterprise managers to further strengthen supervision and provent moral risks. Nevertheless, the board must invest some supervising cost to realize the maximum achievement with the lowest agency cost.This thesis has analysed the effectiveness of the controlling shareholders and the board of directors of the state-enterprises and of the listed nonferrous companies with sufficient proof. From the research, we found that the proportion of the shares holded by the controlling shareholders are positively related to that of directors working for the controlling shareholders and that of the managing directors and part-time directors. It is negatively related to the general managers who work for the controlling shareholders. Since the main body of property right of the state capital could not work properly, the state capital administrations or administrations in charge are not encouraged enough to actively choose the qualified directors and supervise the managing process of the managers.