Research On Industrial Injury Insurance For Migrant Workers

At present,China's employable population is about 930 million and the number of employed people is 770 million,but the number of people covered by industrial injury insurance is only 260 million.It is estimated that at least more than 500 million workers in China are divorced from the industrial injury insurance system,especially the 300 million migrant workers,who are engaged in high industrial injury risk and enjoy low industrial injury security.This situation is seriously inconsistent with the requirements of common prosperity.This paper studies the industrial injury insurance system for migrant workers,and tries to establish an industrial injury insurance mechanism with Chinese characteristics by focusing on the responsibility sharing mechanism of the government,enterprises and migrant workers in the industrial injury insurance system.Firstly,this paper combs the relevant literature in China and the west,and finds that the western industrial injury insurance system with the principle of no fault promotion and unilateral responsibility of employers as the core has important progressive significance,but there are two adaptability problems: first,80% of workers in western countries have relatively stable labor relations,while more than80% of workers in China's labor market are engaged in informal employment,The responsible entity cannot be found to pay the industrial injury insurance premium for it;Second,the west only expanded labor relations on the basis of maintaining the original work-related injury security system for the newly emerging new type of employment.This innovation has very limited reference significance for China's more than 500 million informal employment.Therefore,the theoretical framework of this paper is aimed at the three principles of responsibility sharing in western industrial injury insurance: the principle of government supervision,the principle of employer's responsibility and the principle of personal no fault presumption.Using the tools of public goods theory,risk socialization theory and labor market segmentation theory,this paper puts forward three new principles more suitable for China's reality: the principle of government leadership,the principle of employer's limited liability and the principle of individual industrial injury risk dispersion.Secondly,based on the development process and practical experience of China's industrial injury insurance,this paper deeply dissects the government responsibilities,corporate responsibilities and the rights and obligations of migrant workers,and puts forward specific practical schemes.Finally,the game model and measurement model are established to verify or estimate the above ideas mathematically and chemically,as follows:Government responsibilities.Through the in-depth investigation and systematic research on the emergency management,health,human resources and social security,social security,taxation and other departments related to work-related injury insurance,it is considered that only cross departmental cooperation can realize the all-round governance of work-related injury prevention,compensation and rehabilitation.The primary responsibility of the government lies in scientific legislation and system construction.In addition,the government finance should participate in the overall planning of industrial injury insurance funds at all levels and provide a certain proportion of subsidies to enterprises and migrant workers,so as to encourage both parties to pay fees and expand the coverage of industrial injury insurance.Corporate responsibility.The consequence of enterprises undertaking vague unlimited responsibility is that enterprises generally evade responsibility,which is proved by the lowest payment rate of enterprises in domestic high-risk industries.The "employer's limited liability" proposed in this paper includes "weakening employer's liability" and "clarifying payment mechanism".The purpose of "weakening the employer's responsibility" is not to reduce the responsibility of enterprises,but to further realize the socialization and dispersion of industrial injury risk and promote the decoupling of industrial injury insurance and labor relations.The core of "clarifying the payment mechanism" is to reform the enterprise payment system.Under the current system,enterprises take the total wages of employees as the base(complex labor relations),set differential rates based on industrial risks(floating rates are difficult to implement),and participate in the insurance registration by the Social Security Bureau(the Social Security Bureau has asymmetric information on market subjects),resulting in the ambiguity of corporate responsibility.The policy adjustment idea of this paper is to take the enterprise turnover as the base,set the differential rate based on the industry risk,and the tax bureau will check and collect the fee,so as to clarify the payment base,industry rate and collection organization.Individual rights and obligations of migrant workers.This paper focuses on the two issues of "whether migrant workers should pay and how to pay".First,"individual industrial injury risk dispersion mechanism" is proposed relative to the western "employer responsibility dispersion mechanism",that is,the current industrial injury insurance system is only the mechanism for employers to disperse industrial injury compensation risk,excluding the dispersion of individual industrial injury risk.Individuals can only buy commercial accident insurance,which is a defect in the design of industrial injury insurance system.This paper is committed to providing a mechanism to disperse the risk of work-related injury for informal employees with migrant workers as the main body,that is,the individual payment system of workers.Second,according to the existence of labor relations,this paper divides migrant workers into different types of groups,such as labor relations,non labor relations,new business employment,self-employed,historical pneumoconiosis and so on.If classified policies are implemented,it will inevitably lead to the "fragmentation" of the system.This article holds that the payment of work-related injury insurance for workers will no longer be classified according to the differences between urban and rural registered residence,the nature of unit ownership and the risk of industry.Instead,it will be classified monthly,according to the head,according to the uniform standard,and the payment should be paid in a flexible and voluntary way,so as to facilitate the flow and transfer of workers among different types of work,different units and different regions.Based on the above analysis of the responsibilities of the government,enterprises and migrant workers,this paper constructs a game model and measurement model.Firstly,under the current industrial injury insurance system,build a game model between the government and enterprises to find the equilibrium solution,and build a probit measurement model to verify the above equilibrium solution through595 questionnaires of migrant workers who have suffered from occupational diseases.Secondly,according to the industrial injury insurance reform scheme designed in this paper,reconstruct the game model of the three parties of responsibility and find the optimal solution,and finally realize the optimal balance of government active subsidies,enterprises paying according to regulations and migrant workers' voluntary participation.Finally,the main conclusion of this paper is that we should establish a responsibility sharing mechanism of industrial injury insurance with Chinese characteristics.First,the work-related injury insurance will be popularized,that is,the work-related injury insurance will be defined as all workers' insurance,not just enterprise insurance;Second,the employer's limited liability.If we blindly emphasize the employer's responsibility and let the enterprise unilaterally bear the industrial injury risk of workers in the whole society,it will lead to enterprises competing to evade responsibility,and the rights and interests of a large number of marginal employment and employment outside the enterprise can not be guaranteed;The third is the dispersion of personal industrial injury risk.The dispersion mechanism of industrial injury risk can not only be aimed at enterprises,and can not ignore the needs of a large number of migrant workers and other informal employees.Individual unified standards and flexible voluntary payment have become the necessary system design.The policy recommendations of this paper focus on the tripartite responsibility.First,the government should strengthen the supervision of work safety and occupational health,simplify the procedures of occupational disease diagnosis and industrial injury identification,accelerate the reform of "social security tax levy",improve the overall planning level and actuarial ability of the fund,and increase the financial subsidies to enterprises and individuals;Second,suggestions related to enterprises,promote the decoupling of industrial injury insurance from labor relations,implement the decoupling of "single industrial injury insurance" and "five insurances and one fund",take enterprise turnover as the payment base,strengthen the supervision and law enforcement of floating rate,and establish a "white list" of enterprise social security responsibility;The third is the suggestions related to migrant workers,guide migrant workers to sign labor contracts,focus on the protection of occupational injuries of migrant workers without labor relations,reveal the livelihood of patients with occupational diseases left over by history,guide the reasonable expectation of individual payment of migrant workers,and introduce individual payment standards and systems for workers.The main innovation of this paper is to put forward the theory and mechanism of industrial injury insurance with Chinese characteristics,including the popularization of industrial injury insurance,the limited liability of employers and the dispersion mechanism of personal industrial injury risk.The shortcomings of this paper are that the theoretical depth needs to be further excavated,the application of actuarial technology and other methods is insufficient,and the systematicness of policy recommendations needs to be strengthened.