Studies On Supply Chain Pricing And Coordination Based On Consumers' Strategic Behavior

In the more and more competitive market, retailers have to develop discount strategies to attract more consumers and increase their sales. However, consumers become smarter and they don't rush to order even the current price is below their valuation of commodities. They put their own utility maximization as the goal and decide the optimal buy time. In anticipation of depreciate in the future, consumers will choose to wait, this behavior called consumers'strategy behavior in marketing. As the development of modern information technology, consumers can obtain relevant information of commodities easily, due to the improvement of consumers' culture level, they are good at analyzing and considering, so the proportion of strategic consumer improve continually. Current studies show that consumers' strategic behavior will influence supply chain members'decision and its performance. Therefore, the research on supply chain members'decision and how to cope with consumers have important value of the theory and practice.Based on the new achievements at home and abroad, the paper uses supply chain management, consumer behavior and game theory to discuss supply chain with flexible replenishment mechanism and recycling of waste products. This study focuses on supply chain members'pricing and order policy and is conducted from two respects:theoretical research and numerical analysis. On this basis, it analyzes supply chain members'strategies about initial order quantity and retail price and their coordination when cope with consumers'strategic behaviors. finally, numerical examples are studied by using MATLAB programming. The main researches are as follows:(1) First, based on rational expectations theory, the initial order quantity and price when a retailer and consumers gaming under a centralized supply chain are given. Assumes that the market demand is stochastic, uses consumers'strategic behavior and flexible replenishment to conduct the study. Compared the results with newsvendor model, consumers'strategic behavior have a negative effect on supply chain performance. At the same time, the flexible replenishment mechanism will alleviate the impact. Then we analyze price and order decision under the initial order quantity commitment conditions and it proves that there exists a unique order quantity commitment to maximize the retailer's profit. We also research the retailer's decision and profit impact of the initial order quantity commitment. The study shows that if the retailer makes a commitment about initial order or price before the selling season, he will reduce strategic consumers' negative effect and improve his profit. Then we study a two level supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. We prove the uniqueness of sub-gambling refining Nash equilibrium under the assumption that supplier as leader of the game. Since consumers are strategic, the total profit in decentralized supply chain may higher than centralized supply chain, that is double marginalization is beneficial. On this basis, we set profit with initial order commitment as the goal and discuss the influence of revenue sharing contract on supply chain coordination. By setting up the contract parameters reasonably, the supply chain will be coordinated and the profit will be allocated among supply chain members by changing the parameters. Revenue sharing contract and PM contract will solve the problem brought by dishonest retailer and make supply chain's performance achieve initial level under the initial order commitment or price commitment.(2) Considering the risk preference of manufacture, retailer and consumers and studying the supply chain price, order and coordination problems. Analyze the influence on supply chain decision and performance brought by the metabolic risk preference coefficient.(3) In a two stage supply chain with random demand, the paper considers consumers'strategic behavior and flexible replenishment mechanism and studies the supply chain members'optimal decision and coordination problem. Beside, the equilibrium retail price and order are given base on the rational expectation hypothesis. Since the two stage newsboy model with retailer's price commitment will degrade to the classical newsboy model. The paper focuses on the retailer's decision and its profit under initial quantity commitment mechanism. We set profit under the initial quantity commitment as the research objective, use two-part tariff and revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain and prove that with reasonable parameters, the two contracts will coordinate the supply chain. Beside, the two-part tariff can allocate profit among supply chain members and the revenue sharing contract can make manufacturer and retailer share the risk. Finally, the paper expands the model from three aspects (goods'value are related to time; flexible replenishment of remanufacture; prices of two stages are decision variable) and makes it more theoretical and applicable.(4) Suppose that consumer's valuation for goods are different, the paper studies pricing problem in two-stage supply chain. In the centralized supply chain, we study the optimal pricing and order strategy of new product and remanufactured product. In the decentralized supply chain, we discuss the optimal pricing and order strategy under Bertrand game and Stacklberg game according to different market position of manufacturers and remanufactures. The paper focuses on different valuation and discount factor's influence on supply chain members' decision and profit.The paper's main innovation points can be summarized as following:(1) The current research on consumers'strategic behaviors is based on single mechanism. The paper combines the flexible replenishment mechanism and the initial order commitment or retailer price commitment and proves that multiple measures will reduce the negative impact and improve the supply chain's performance.(2) Lots of researches suppose that supply chain members are risk neutral and most of them only consider consumer's risk preference. The paper supposes that supply chain members and consumers have risk appetite and analyzes the impact of their risk preferences.(3) The paper discusses supply chain's pricing and coordination under the condition of consumers'strategic behavior and flexible replenishment mechanism to promote the two-stage newsboy model.(4) The close-loop supply chain, remanufacturing and green supply chain management are research hotspot of supply chain management. But there have been relatively little study on remanufacturing combing consumers'strategic behavior. The paper considers consumer's strategic behavior in the case of competition between manufacturer and remanufacture and discusses the pricing problem in the two-stage supply chain.