| Since the burst of the financial crisis, it is unprecedented upsurge to strengthen the shadow banking supervision. The regulatory authorities attempt to correct the regulatory rules and adapt to changes in the financial structure of products and services of the latest. However, the shadow banks accompanying their creativity, freedom and complication, create an "innovation-supervision prohibition-innovation" regulatory arbitrage model, but the government always left the financial innovation behind. If things go on like this, the systematic risk of the shadow banking system may damage the whole financial industry. It is quite difficult to take effective supervision for the shadow banking system:firstly, the regulatory authority for the definition of the shadow banking system is still in the exploratory stage. At the beginning of2014, the general office of the State Council issued the "Notice of problems about strengthening the shadow banking"(Guo Ban Fa [2013]107article). No matter how the legal level of this notice is, as far as the content is concerned, the notice didn't figure out the exact definition of shadow banking Chinese system, roughly dividing the shadow banking system into three categories. Secondly, the three kinds of shadow banks are simply enumerative classification and do not fully cover the Chinese shadow system extension.As the undefined concept of financial institutions, what about the comprehensive and effective supervision on it? Thirdly, the shadow banking system is the product of financial innovation. New shadow banking institutions and product will continuously derivate following the lasting derivation of financial products. But the regulation needs to have stability, how can the rule changes keep up with the update of the shadow banking system speed? In addition, the shadow banking system scale, including the shadow banking institutions, complex business and products, is so huge. These shadow banking entities or decided entities with different financial attributions belong to different regulators and even some cross shadow banking products also belong to multiple regulatory authorities. In Chinese, we carry out the implementation of separate supervision,"one of three" as a regulator of parallel, how can this regulators classify the complex shadow banking business and product, make reasonable and feasible strategies to the cross products? These problems are uneasy to solve by several "way" or "notice" issued by the regulatory authorities.This paper will try to show the real shadow banking Chinese system from the connotation, extension, characteristics, evolution, classification, regulatory and other aspects, and on the basis of the shadow banking system supervision into the right track. This thesis will try to analyze and answer these questions and the main body is divided into six chapters, including the following parts:The first chapter will define the concept of the shadow banking system; make a clear definition on connotation, extension, and evolution; make an analysis on its reality. The shadow banking Chinese system is defined as credit intermediary system, apart from the traditional system of commercial bank, which has the maturity matching, liquidity, credit transfer, lever function, entity or decided entity attributions. After a full understanding of the subject, it is necessary to demonstrate the shadow banking system from the point of financial regulation supervision. The shadow banking system is an important component of the modern financial system, with financial instability, information asymmetry and run the risk. Furthermore, compared with traditional financial industry, the shadow banking system looks much more professional and complex. From the perspective of financial fragility, public interests and public enforcement theory analysis, the standards of shadow banking system need financial supervision. Meanwhile, the shadow banking system also requires regulators financial constraints to make up for the defect of incomplete law. In addition, we have to explain that the shadow banking system supervision theory not only includes the government supervision, but also the financial--self--egulatory theory and market constraints theory.The second chapter is based on the complexity, creativity of the shadow banking system and makes a research on its classification. It is inevitable musing process to have a classification in complex recognition process. There are various classification standards according to various classification purposes. Therefore, it is wise to state the purpose before making the standards. The classification purpose of this paper is to take effective supervision on shadow banking system, so it is easier to execute supervision for the regulation when making a classification. According to the subjects, the classification of shadow banking system can facilitate supervision authorities to judge which kind of shadow banking system to be supervised in case of what his own shadow banking supervision, to prevent the emergence of regulatory overlap or regulatory vacuum. Therefore, we can divide the shadow banking China system roughly into three categories, namely, the cross product and business, the shadow banking system in non banking financial institutions and operations, decided financial institutions. We can conclude the risk feature of three kinds of shadow banking system after detailed analyzing on its operation model, distribution model and regulation about above three categories. What we have done aims to carry out the classification regulation and supervision.The third chapter makes a comparative research on the supervision of the shadow banking system. I will make a history research about regulatory policies among American, British, European, and the Basel Committee, the group of20nations, the international monetary fund and discuss the supervision experience between developed countries and international financial organizations. The reason why I choose these above as the main object of study, for one thing, the US, UK and EU are currently the most mature area about shadow banking system. Since the financial crisis, they are making sufficient reform and the makes a trend. For another, the international financial regulations pay much attention to the shadow banking system represented by the Basel Committee, the group of20nations, the International Monetary Fund which issued a series of financial supervision system and protocol. Thus, all the supervision gradually pay attention to the regulation of the shadow banking system and issue new regulations which bring the following enlightenments for China:correctly guide the shadow banking system and encourage financial innovation, distinguish the shadow banks category, implement of classification regulation and supervision.The fourth chapter aims to detect the defects of China government's shadow banking system regulation and analyzes the reasons and improves the systems. Relying on the strength of the government will be difficult to deal with the continuous innovation of the shadow banking business model in the complex of the shadow banking Chinese system. At the same time, the regulatory authorities make poor effect on the regulation of the shadow banking system:cross shadow banking regulatory framework for regulation is invalid, the non bank financial institutions business irregularities caused by the regulators, decided financial institutions have not yet formed. In depth analysis of the causes of the defects of traditional government regulation model, this study proposes three paths of regulatory reform, that is, the radical, gradual reform, conservative, and combined with the development of the shadow banking Chinese system at the present stage, concluded gradual reform takes more advantages. The stage conclusion:in order to regulate the shadow banking regulatory arbitrage effectively, negative externality behavior, make up for operating the shadow banking institutions and regulatory professional deficit, we need to take gradual reform on traditional supervision model, construct macro supervision framework and improve the coordination mechanisms of shadow banking systems. According the risk characteristics of the shadow banking systems, we carry out supervise respectively, realizing the combination of comprehensive monitoring and correction of key regulatory strategy.The fifth chapter discusses the introduction of embedded--self--supervision on shadow banking system in the regulation of necessity, structural conditions and the implementation path. The core of embedded--self--supervision is not out of government regulation. In contrast, embedded--self--supervision is embedded in the government supervision, while not a pure economic field or completely out of any government regulation. It has the characteristics of government regulation and self-regulation in the deterrence of the shadow banks, the arbitrage, the hidden nature of the financial system, should have obvious effect, can be used as a good supplement of the government supervision and coordination. This chapter firstly goes to a deep research on embedded--self--supervision from both the positive and negative aspects of the advantages of embedded--self--supervision, deal with the ability of cross--border risks, he failure of government regulation and professional deficit, rules based regulation defects. The paper has a sufficient argument on the necessarity of embedded--self-supervision. Then, this chapter will research the implementation path of the shadow banking systems, from institution level and system level design. In the shadow banking institution into the principles of regulation and "self commitment" regulatory tools; in the shadow banking system level we distinguish the shadow banking system according to the level of risk, the shadow banking system and cause systemic risk to the possible mandatory "co-self--insurance" mechanism.The sixth chapter argues the efficiency of the shadow banking system supervision in the market constrain mechanism. The mechanism of market based on an effective system of financial supervision, having increasingly prominent importance for making up for the defects and other aspects of the traditional government supervision. With the market constraint theory, the system practical significance arbitrage behavior given the shadow banking system supervision theoretical response:Shadow banking systems resorts to its innovative, flexible implementation of regulatory arbitrage, and government regulation always takes hysteresis quality. So the design of systems should make full use of effective market constrain to remedy the government regulation. With the market constraint mechanism to motivate and benefit related people to the motivation of shadow banking system in order to reduce the supervision cost and improve the efficiency of supervision. Finally, according to the serious lack of information, it plays an important role from the system level to develop the market constrain mechanism to the shadow banking system. |
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