| The home appliance industry constitutes a crucial part of the light industry that covers the most extensive consumer goods.In general,today's home appliance companies are faced by a major challenge,i.e.,how to promote the efficient use of resources and low-carbon development in their production and operation.Despite recent discussions on green operation of home appliance companies,existing studies have been mostly conducted by looking at the industrial chain as a whole rather than analyzing each link specifically.Some literature works focus on green innovative technologies in upstream appliance production,yet they tend to be empirical,with little emphasis on the production,design and pricing mechanisms of products.The same is true for studies on the promotion and recycling of midstream and downstream appliances,where there is minimal consideration of carbon cap-and-trade mechanisms and channel integration.To coordinate the green operations of home appliance companies,this is expected to further expand the environmental responsibility of producers from an industry chain perspective,extending it from production to manufacturing,distribution and retail,recycling and disposal,and waste utilization.Besides,there is a concern in the industry to build a green and low-carbon industrial chain around the R&D and design,distribution and consumption,recycling and waste disposal of home appliances.In this regard,this paper introduces game theory,case simulation and system dynamics to comprehensively study the green operation decision-making mechanism of Chinese home appliance companies from three aspects,i.e.,R&D and design,promotion,and recycling of green home appliances,with a view to providing reference for the government and home appliance companies' behavior decision-making.The main points and conclusions of the study are as follows:(1)Employ green technology innovation mechanism into the R&D and design of green home appliances upstream of the industrial chain to enhance the greenness of home appliances.Firstly,by taking into account government subsidies in green technological innovation,it constructs a decision model of green technological innovation of home appliance companies based on government subsidies.Secondly,it solves the model for the optimal decision options in three scenarios:"government subsidies+enterprise green technology innovation","enterprise independent green technology innovation",and "no green technology innovation".Lastly,it analyzes the critical conditions for home appliance companies to improve product greenness and green technology innovation performance in different scenarios,and reveals the relationship between government incentives and corporate green technology innovation factors and home appliance production,pricing and green innovation performance.As the results suggest,the choice of incentives depends heavily on the green technology innovation performance of appliance companies.For manufacturers,green technology innovation promotes greenness and market demand for home appliances,whereas greener products require government subsidies.Apart from enhancing the greenness of home appliances,the method leads to a higher consumer surplus and overall supply-chain economics.(2)Adopt carbon cap-and-trade mechanism in the production and promotion of green home appliances midstream of the industry chain to facilitate low-carbon promotion and cooperation in emission reduction of home appliance companies.Firstly,based on carbon trading price,carbon reduction level and marketing effort,it builds a carbon reduction and promotion decision model,and produces four decision options,namely,centralized decision,decentralized decision,low-carbon promotion,and cooperative reduction.Secondly,it compares the equilibrium outcome and derives the optimal strategies of cooperative carbon reduction and low-carbon promotion for home appliance companies.Lastly,it performs case simulation experiments to verify the effectiveness and main influencing factors of the proposed scenarios.According to the results,both low-carbon promotion and cooperative reduction decisions contribute to the global optimization and green operation of home appliance supply chain,but higher profits request cooperation between upstream and downstream enterprises.The method taps into potential profits for companies while boosting demand for green appliances.(3)Introduce recycling mechanism in the recycling and remanufacturing of waste home appliances downstream of the industry chain to improve the recycling rate and remanufacturing benefits of waste appliances.Firstly,given the sales channel choice of different waste appliance recycling subjects,it draws up a recycling remanufacturing decision scheme of multi-channel recycling and dual-channel marketing for waste home appliances,so as to analyze the impact of channel differences on the recycling and remanufacturing of waste appliances.Secondly,it extends the traditional recycling decision model to the scenarios of"remanufacturing benefit" and "environmental gain/loss" for comprehensive comparison.As the research shows,the remanufacturing benefit depends mainly on the investment coefficient of the recycler and the cost saving of remanufacturing,and the corporate profit depends mainly on the leading side of the recycling channel.However,changes in recycling channels are frequently accompanied by different environmental impacts of recycling by manufacturers and retailers.The method optimizes the investment coefficient of recyclers and increases the recycling rate of waste appliances,thereby promoting the integration of recycling channels.(4)For coordination in the green operation of the industrial chain of home appliance companies,based on evolutionary game+SD,it puts forward an evolutionary mechanism of cooperation between government and home appliance companies from a dynamic perspective.Taking the lead to incorporate environmental management costs into the co-evolutionary game model of green operation of home appliance companies,it dynamically describes the influence of government regulation,enterprise emission reduction benefits,carbon trading price and promotion elasticity coefficient on the stability of green operation of government and home appliance companies,thus bridging the gap of existing literature,which studies the coordination of interests between government and home appliance companies in green operation from a static perspective.As can be seen from the results,manufacturers' carbon reduction decisions mainly depend on carbon trading price and carbon reduction input costs,distributors'low-carbon promotion decisions mainly depend on promotion elasticity coefficients,and manufacturers' and distributors' strategy choices directly determine whether they are subject to strict government supervision.On account of the findings of the above four dimensions,this paper finally proposes countermeasures and suggestions to effectively enhance the green operations of home appliance companies from the government and enterprise levels.Decision-makers are advised to make coordination,optimization and management by combining the actual components of green operation of home appliance companies and the behaviors of market economic agents with the models,methods,conclusions and countermeasures proposed in this paper. |
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