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Studies On Pricing And Remanufacturing Mode In A Closed-loop Supply Chain With Green Consumption Behavior

Posted on:2021-03-14Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z W FengFull Text:PDF
GTID:1481306500966539Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The basic policy of “Green Development” in “Made in China 2025” indicates that,China is in a way of ecological civilization by developing a circular economy,improving the efficiency of resource recycling,and building a green manufacturing system.As one of the effective ways to develop a circular economy,remanufacturing greatly promotes resource conservation and environmental protection,which improves consumers’ awareness of recycling and guides green consumption.In the process of reproduction and sales,used products,as components for remanufactured products,have many different attributes from new products,such as environmental protection,low price,etc.With these differences,consumers provide heterogeneity of the acceptance degree of remanufactured products.Based on green consumption behavior and multiple remanufacturing modes,pricing,the unit outsourcing or license fee,and the collection rate are analyzed in a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer,a third-party remanufacturer,and a retailer.This thesis focuses on the effects of green consumption behavior,environmentally responsible behavior,and the retailer and government participation on pricing and performance of the closed-loop supply chain,and how they influence the remanufacturing modes selection and the introducing strategy for third-party remanufacturer,as follows:Initially,from the perspective of green consumption behavior,Chapter 2develops a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer and a third-party remanufacturer,where the manufacturer has two strategies for third-party remanufacturing,outsourcing and authorization,to analyze pricing,the unit outsourcing or license fee,and the collection rate.Moreover,according to the key factors such as the degree of green preference to new/remanufactured products,the manufacturer determines the condition for the choice of different third-party remanufacturing mode.Only when the value discount rate for remanufactured products is medium,firms prefer identical third-party remanufacturing mode to achieve a win-win situation.When the gap between green consumer preferences for new and remanufactured products is low,outsourcing is the optimal strategy for the manufacturer;otherwise,authorization is the optimal strategy for the manufacturer.In the alternative model with considering environmentally responsible behavior,both the prices of new and remanufactured products and the collection rate increase,but the profits decrease.In addition,when the environmental cost is very low,manufacturers are more likely to choose outsourcing rather than authorizing;otherwise,manufacturers choose authorizing.Then,Chapter 3 considers the manufacturer’s self-remanufacturing mode and determines the incentive to adopt this mode when the potential third-party remanufacturer only accept outsourcing(or authorization).Under the potential outsourcing scenario,only when the remanufacturing cost is mendium,the manufacturer weigh the profits to choose the optimal remanufacturing mode.However,under the potential authorization scenario,the manufacturer select authorization mode only when the extra remanufacturing cost is low.In the alternative model with considering strategic consumers and far-sighted manufacturers,the presence of strategic consumers can cause manufacturers to lower the prices of all products and damage their whole profits.Finally,Chapter 4 develops a closed-loop supply chain considering the retailer participation and government subsidy or carbon tax to investigate the mechanism of adopting different remanufacturing modes.Under the outsourcing scenario,the third-party remanufacturer is non-profitable when the government adopts the carbon tax mechanism and will not participate in remanufacturing.When the government adopts the subsidy mechanism,the profit of the third-party remanufacturer is very small,but the profit of the retailer improves.Under the authorization scenario,the manufacturer’s and the third-party remanufacturer’s can achieve a win-win situation when the government adopts the subsidy mechanism,while the retailer has a low profit and the government obtains small benefits.Only when the government adopts the carbon tax mechanism can bring the closed-loop supply chain members and the government to achieve a multi-win situation.In summary,based on the environmental attributes of used products and the differentiation of consumers’ green consumption behavior,this thesis analyzes remanufacturing modes by studying the prices,etc.Many important findings are derived.Specifically,firms in the closed-loop supply chain select an identical third-party remanufacturing mode under certain conditions.The driving force for the manufacturer to introduce third-party remanufacturing mode mainly depends on the proportion of green consumers and the remanufacturing cost.The retailer and the government participation may not result in a higher profit.
Keywords/Search Tags:closed-loop supply chain management, used products, remanufacturing mode, environmentally responsible behavior, green consumption, game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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