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Study On The Evolution Of Attitude And Behavior In The Social Dilemma

Posted on:2022-09-17Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:M Y WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1480306338484784Subject:Applied Mathematics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the social dilemma abstracted from practical issues such as public land issues,high seas fisheries,ecological environment protection,etc.,some non-compulsory factors outside of laws and regulations can be considered to guide individual behavior.This article considers the characteristics of individual attitudes and behaviors,and classifies the group based on above two characteristics.Groups are divided into four categories when attitudes and behaviors are divided into two.On the basis that attitudes can be transformed and behaviors can learn from each other,the group evolution model is established.By giving the transformation law of the attitude and the cooperation to explain the emerge and the sustainability of cooperation and provide some new ideas for getting rid of the social dilemma.The main contributions are as follows:In Chapter 2,considering the one-way influence of individual attitudes on individual behaviors,two different group evolution models are established according to different divisions.Firstly,according to the attitude of whether to express their intentions,the individuals in the group are divided into the silent and the speaking.Considering that the public rewards silent cooperators,a group evolution model in which individual attitudes affect individual behaviors is established.Through the analysis of the numerical results,it is found that sufficient public recognition of silent cooperators can promote cooperation.When individuals are less affected by others,appropriate rewards for silent cooperators can effectively promote cooperation.When individuals are heavily influenced by others,no matter how much the reward for silent cooperators is increased,it will not be able to effectively promote cooperation.Secondly,according to the attitude of whether to pay attention to related topics in the dilemma,the individuals in the group are divided into followers and indifferents.Considering that cooperators can get additional compensation that is positively related to the proportion of followers(social attention),another group evolution model in which individual attitudes affect individual behaviors is established.The numerical results show that the indifference is one of the reasons for the ecological tragedy.If the public keeps a certain degree of concern about ecological issues,an appropriate increase in investment can large the compensation and promote cooperation obviously.In Chapter 3,considering the interplay between individual attitude and individual behavior,a group evolution model of the interaction between individual attitude and individual behavior is established.The group is divided into four,indifferent cooperators,concerned cooperators,indifferent defectors and concerned defectors.The positive effect of the proportion of followers(social attention)on the compensation received by the cooperators,it reflects the influence of individual attitudes on individual behavior.The effect of the proportion of defectors on the conversion probability of the indifferent,it reflects the influence of individual behavior on individual attitudes.The results show that when the proportion of followers is high,the additional compensation to the cooperators can effectively promote cooperation.And the mechanism of betrayal behaviors that prompt the indifferent to change attitudes can effectively promote cooperation,and different mechanisms can promote cooperation to varying degrees.
Keywords/Search Tags:Evolutionary game model, Social dilemma, Cooperative behavior, Propagation dynamics model, Differential equation
PDF Full Text Request
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