THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. TRADE POLICY: AN EVALUATION OF THEORY (TRANSNATIONALS, THE STATE, TAXES, TARIFFS, UNITED STATES)

The object of this study is to evaluate the theoretical concepts of rival "political economies" of U.S. trade policy. Public choice theory, elite theory, statist theory, and world systems theory are evaluated against patterns in three U.S. trade policy outcomes: import barriers, export distortions, and export restraints. While plausible models suggested by each of these theories have been constructed from selected trade policy outcomes, research guided by the concepts of any one theory cannot resolve problems of theoretical overdetermination. Where rival theories, for different reasons, have similar expectations about patterns in one sort of outcome, theories must be evaluated for their ability to comprehend a broader set of outcomes. Each theory was evaluated for its ability to explain multiple outcomes: implementation of NTBs as well as tariff legislation, the industry distribution of export distorting tax subsidies as well as the industry distribution of tariff liberalization, and the imposition of export restraint as well as import restraint.;Public choice theory correctly predicts that the effective resistance of some industries to liberalization depends on their lower political organization costs given the structure of representation.;Elite theory also explains the distribution of tax subsidies, for which import protection is a legitimation. Tax deferral benefits are distributed to industries in accordance with their capital expenditures largely independent of political "organization costs.";Elite theory cannot explain export restraints, however, a burden on the elites it expects to be most influential. Statist theory explains export restraints and the residual pattern of import protection as a product of U.S. foreign policy. Statist theory, on the other hand, does not predict anti-liberal export distortion by the state.;World systems theory provides explanations for the three patterns. Residual protection remains where production is not globally integrated by U.S. firms. Where NTBs have been used, they tend to be less restrictive where intra-firm trade is large. The distribution of tax subsidies reflects an expected structural constraint of capital on the state. Export restraints are required as contradictions emerge from the promotion of intra-firm trade by a hegemonic state.