| This dissertation is a set of four essays on the theory of voluntary contributions of public goods.;The first essay discusses an individual's decision under uncertainty and suggests that a first-order prediction error only leads to a second-order utility loss to himself, but the utility change to the other people and the change of social welfare are first-order. It is also shown that the risk averse individuals would like to give precise information of their true levels of contributions under certain conditions.;The second essay addresses the sustainability of the Pareto provision of public goods. The results of this paper suggest that individuals feel the temptation to cheat in a Pareto coalition. By applying Friedman's "trigger strategy," I derive sufficient conditions for the individuals to remain in the coalition in repeated game cases.;The third essay studies the efficiency of charitable organizations in providing public goods. It is found that the individuals' reactions to the administrative efficiency are ambiguous. If the objective of a philanthropic intermediary is to maximize the output of the public good, then it will maximize its efficiency. However, in general, a budget maximizing organization does not necessarily need to act efficiently.;The fourth essay proposes a reputational model of the private provision of public goods. I assume that an individual enjoys a good reputation in the community to the extent that he shares the costs of financing the public good. This model suggests the possible existence of a hill-shaped Nash reaction curve. Under certain parameter values, this paper offers an example to show that the dynamic trajectory derived from the hill-shaped reaction curve could be described as chaotic. |
