Operational art and the German command system in World War I

This work argues that, in the World War I period, the German army's concept of operations and the operational level of war were linked to its command system. Certain aspects of the command system, in turn, improved the German army's ability to carry out innovations in the area of tactical doctrine.;The dissertation begins with a brief definition of operations and the operational level of war. It moves on to an examination of the German General Staff as an institution--its position in the German military heirarchy, its working methods, and the selection and training of officers. There is a discussion of the origins of the German General Staff, in particular aspects of the German Wars of Unification. Next there is a discussion of the German General Staff's practice of "leadership by directive" and its extension Vollmacht. Both these discussions are tied into operational developments during the Battle of the Marne, in particular the mission of Lt.-Col. Hentsch to the front. There is an extensive discussion of the German decision to retreat from the Marne.;Then there is a chapter on the German development of elastic defense tactics during the war, highlighted by the career of Col. Fritz von Lossberg. There is a similar chapter on the development of artillery tactics under Lt.-Col. Georg Bruchmueller. Some attempt is made to use the secondary literature of draw comparisons with the British experience in these areas.;The dissertation argues that a concept of operations and operational plans helped the German command system to function. In turn, certain aspects of the command system encouraged or facilitated tactical innovation. The link between operations and strategy is also discussed.