| In this dissertation, I offer a way to reconcile the view that we can be legitimately blamed for our beliefs with the view that we do not have the same kind of control over our beliefs that we have over action. In chapter one, I argue that we hold people accountable for their beliefs by blaming them, and that this blame has a characteristic force similar to the force of moral blame for action. After distinguishing between moral and epistemic blame for beliefs, I argue that accounts of moral blame for action can be extended to account for both forms of doxastic blame. In chapter two, I defend a view of doxastic control that helps ground the legitimacy of this doxastic blame. I argue that while we lack the same direct voluntary control over our beliefs that we enjoy over action, such control is not necessary to satisfy the control condition for blame. I argue instead that we enjoy a form of indirect control over our beliefs in the form of the capacity to actively engage in reflection. And finally, in chapter three, I bring the considerations of the previous chapters to bear on faith. I argue that it's plausible to think that faith is partly constituted by belief. But in that case, since we lack direct voluntary control over belief, we also lack voluntary control over faith. However, I argue that since we still have indirect control over whether we have faith, we can still be held accountable for our faith. |
