THE POLISH MILITARY AS A POLITICAL FORCE: THE ARMY DURING THE CRISIS OF 1980--1981 (POLAND)

The 1981 martial law in Poland set a precedent in the history of the Soviet bloc; with Soviet concurrence, the military elite of an Eastern European satellite superseded the civilian apparatchiks as the leader of the communist party and government. Until the 1981 crackdown the military was exempt from public criticism and considered the embodiment of the highest patriotic values; its special position contributed to the success of the 1981 martial law.;The crackdown was carefully prepared and executed. During the first 12 months of martial law Jaruzelski consolidated his control of the party and convinced the Soviets that he was the only leader within the PUWP capable of guaranteeing Soviet interests in Poland. The party and administration were purged in 1982 and martial law decrees converted into permanent legislation. Jaruzelski's economic recovery plan of 1982 was a failure.;Moscow's reliance on the Polish military during the 1980-81 crisis is not likely to become a pattern of crisis management in Eastern Europe in the near future; however, this reliance suggests a trend towards increased intra-bloc pluralism in Eastern Europe. While Moscow still decides the fundamental systemic, defense, and foreign policy issues, the Soviets are no longer capable of micromanaging the daily operations of satellite regimes.;The military's gradual takeover of the PUWP during the 1980-81 crisis followed a careful, if ad hoc, strategy. The military took a hard-line stance against the union, while challenging in a series of official statements the apparatchiks' ability to govern. As the apparatchiks' power eroded, the replacement of the Kania regime by Jaruzelski's men became to Moscow the only alternative, short of a direct WTO invasion of Poland. The Soviets decided to accept Jaruzelski's plan during a December 1980 Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow; between December 1980 and October 1981 the Kremlin followed a two-track policy of searching for a political solution while keeping the Polish military option open. The Soviets made the final decision to rely on Jaruzelski's plan in October, 1981, when the general was appointed First Secretary of the PUWP.