PRELUDE TO MARTIAL LAW: AN EXAMINATION OF PRE-1972 PHILIPPINE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

This research surveys the history of Philippine civil-military relations from Spanish times through the declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos in September 1972. It attempts to validate or invalidate the heretofore accepted thesis that the civil power of the pre-1972 Philippine military was negligible and the proclamation of martial law in that year a dramatic discontinuity in the history of Philippine civil-military relations.;The principal sources for this study have been the pre-martial law Philippine press, available US military attache and diplomatic reporting on the Philippines, the scholarly literature and, to a minor extent, official Philippine materials published by, or about, that nation's armed forces.;The study has found that the Philippine military historically has possessed fairly substantial--not negligible--civil power and influence. This finding is significant in that it casts additional doubt on the success of the Philippines' twentieth century "experiment in democracy" in the decades before the martial law declaration. It also shows the Philippines to have experienced a civil-military record bearing considerable similarity to those of many of its Southeast Asian neighbors. Finally, it suggests that the potential for a future period of outright military rule in the Philippines is substantial--indeed, a long term probability.;An informal system of categories is employed as a yardstick by which military influence is measured. The categories are: (1) the portion of the national budget expended on maintaining the armed forces; (2) the size of the armed forces; (3) the extent to which important government civil posts are filled by active duty military officers; (4) the extent of involvement of the armed forces in military civic action activities; (5) the proximity of relationship between the armed forces and the Philippine Chief Executive; (6) the extent of partisan involvement of the armed forces in political activity, particularly in elections; and (7) armed forces control of the national police, the Philippine Constabulary, or lack thereof. These indicators are supplemented by utilization of a limited number of other categories of influence as appropriate.