| I present three models that examine the relationship between groups, where group members face some impediment to perfectly coordinating their actions. I present three distinct applications to the political economy of conflict.;In the first, we study a coordination problem where two distinct groups of individuals are in competition with each other. One group (regime opponents) prefers a change in regime, and can participate in an attack which if sufficiently large, causes regime change. The other group (regime adherents) prefers the status quo and can support the regime, making it more resistant to attack. We derive and analyze the endogenous strength of the regime. We show how changes in the incentives of one group influence the coordination of the other. We isolate the coordinating effect of public information which results from the ''two-sidedness'' of the coordination problem, and show that coordination between regime adherents intensifies the already disproportionate effect of public information. Specifically, we show that public information affects the actions of individuals in each group identically, regardless of disparities in the quality of private information available to members of each group, implying that commonly observed sources of information will coordinate both regime adherents and regime opponents in exactly the same way.;In the second, we begin with the observation that elites face a daunting coordination problem when contemplating a coup. Citizens, who desire political reform, face a similar coordination problem when contemplating protest. Since elites and citizens interact with the same leadership, these coordination problems are invariably linked. We develop a model which exploits this link to isolate an informational mechanism connecting popular protests and coups. Protests aggregate citizen information and provide elites with a public signal which helps them coordinate in a coup. We show that elites ''over-react'' to protest as a consequence of its publicity, and provide a microfounded explanation as to why elites use protests to facilitate coordination. Our model also suggests that protests in countries with media freedom better facilitate elite coordination. To test this, we examine how media freedom affects the relationship between protests and coups. The empirical analysis shows the effect of protests on coups is exacerbated in countries where media is free.;In the third, mass killings are a tactic employed by some governments, presumably to reduce threats. We develop a theory that focuses on how the compliance decisions of repression agents tasked with carrying out atrocities affect the coordination dilemma of individuals contemplating rebellion, and subsequently, how the coordination problem of regime opponents induces a coordination problem between repression agents. We show that the effectiveness of mass killings, perceived through its lethality, has a positive relationship with the regime's ability to survive a rebellion. We then explore the role of strategic uncertainty at three levels: between regime opponents, between repression agents, and between regime opponents and repression agents. Finally, we explore implications that are relevant for the empirical study of mass killings. |
