FORTIFICATIONS AND UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR DEFENSE SHELTERS FOR NATO TROOPS (POLICY, SECURITY

Improvements in NATO's conventional, chemical, and nuclear defenses are clearly needed; but constraints on changing NATO's forces are severe. Better NATO defenses must be achieved at a low economic cost, without changing NATO strategy, without adding more active duty troops or TNW, and without threatening the Soviets.;Simple forms of field fortifications would improve the defensive strength of NATO forces without violating these constraints. PGMs are extremely powerful weapons that are much more effective when their operators enjoy the protection fortifications offer. Because the mission of defending fortifications and firing PGMs is simple relative to fighting a mobile war with armored vehicles, greater reliance could be placed on cheaper and more numerous West European reserves and militia forces.;A simple corrugated pipe shelter buried seven feet underground would protect men against TNW as large as 100 KT striking as close as 600 meters. Since underground shelters seal air-tight they provide protection from chemical and biological weapons.;A fixed defense program would be very affordable, costing around $2 billion. In addition to being much less expensive, shelters and fortifications are also attractive because they do not suffer from problems of poor reliability associated with most new high technology weapons.;Because shelters and fortifications can be built very quickly it is possible to build them in crisis time and thus reduce the economic and political costs of adopting this program. Implementation strategies that call for surveying sites, training, and stockpiling shelter parts now are feasible. Planting forests for defensive purposes, the only necessary peace time preparation besides stockpiling shelter parts, would have a positive effect on program acceptability. The emotional way in which nuclear issues are often considered, European fear of limited nuclear war on their soil, and a host of bureaucratic problems could create great controversy. However, the fact that shelters and fortifications are inherently defensive systems is a tremendous selling point. The FRG would appreciate the greater commitment to forward defense entailed in fixed defenses and the deterrence benefits of increasing the credibility of the TNW first use threat. The program involves burying corrugated pipe, not adding any weapons, so it may not attract much attention. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.).