| This study examines the investigations of "understanding" and "following a rule" as the central examples of Wittgenstein's grammatical method of investigating everyday language in his later philosophy. On this reading, Wittgenstein's aim is not to say what understanding is, but to show what "understanding" consists in, primarily through an examination of the application of the phrase "Now I understand.";The examination of "understanding" in this study is in two parts. The first deals with the background theme of understanding in the early passages of the Investigations: Wittgenstein illustrates each stage of his investigation of meaning by an examination of the psychological terms for grasping that meaning. These investigations contrast what comes to mind with a word or utterance, what it seems to represent, with the actual application of the expression in a language-game. By bringing into relief the background of the language-game in every use of words, Wittgenstein's project amounts to an examination of the constitution of sense.;The second and main part of the study examines the explicit investigation of understanding and following a rule in sections 134-242 of the Investigations, a structure of great symmetry revolving around two questions: what justifies the claim "Now I understand," and when it is used rightly. These investigations frame a long interpolation about "reading" and "deriving," and the investigation as a whole functions as a critique of the Tractatus account of reading off a state of affairs from a proposition like deriving a piece of music from a score. The first half of the investigation reveals how circumstances enter constitutively into understanding, the second brings into relief the rule-governed practices by which we put them into words. A focus on the grammatical nature of Wittgenstein's investigation of "following a rule" illuminates controversies concerning skepticism, objectivity, and individual and social dimensions of rule-following. A final chapter briefly sketches the prospects for a Wittgensteinian account of belief and other intentional states, based on Part II of the Investigations. |
