MAKING FOREIGN POLICY: THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE (SUEZ CRISIS)

This dissertation examines the process of making foreign policy for the Middle East in the post-World War II years. I have described and analyzed recommendations by the National Security Council, formulation of a plan in executive offices, and its final approval by Congress. The end product was the Eisenhower Doctrine, which declared U.S. commitment to defense of Western interests in the Middle East, by arms if necessary. The announcement responded to external events: namely, the decline of British influence in the region, made apparent in the Suez Crisis of 1956, and intimations of Soviet moves into the Middle East.Decisions in Washington rested upon security council studies, made largely during the Truman administration. Formulation of a policy awaited the invasion of Egypt spurred by Soviet threats of military intervention. The basic outline of the Middle East plan was the handiwork of Secretary Dulles, under the direction of President Eisenhower. The administration presented its final version, the Eisenhower Doctrine, to Congress on January 5, 1957. With the approval of both the House and Senate, it hoped to make clear the American resolve to deter communist penetration of the Middle East.Reasons for U.S. commitment to the area became evident in the years after World War II. Rich oilfields and a strategic location indicated to policymakers the importance of the Middle East to Western security establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 contributed humanitarian concern to defense demands. Until the mid-1950s, the Tripartite Declaration of Britain, France, and the U.S. guaranteed Middle East stability by controlling the flow of arms to states of the area and ensuring their boundaries. But in 1955, an Egyptian agreement with Czechoslovakia to purchase Soviet arms ended Western monopoly and alerted Washington to renewed Russian interest in the Middle East. The next year, nationalization of the Suez Canal led to a joint Anglo-French-Israeli attack of Egypt to force settlement of the crisis favorable to their interests. Its failure in November 1956 initiated a sequence of events leading to a new role for the U.S. in the Middle East.