A STUDY OF RUSSELL'S THEORY OF DESIRE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS DOCTRINE OF NEUTRAL MONISM IN 'THE ANALYSIS OF MIND'

In The Analysis of Mind (1921), Russell criticizes a theory that considers desire a conscious mental phenomenon directed towards an imagined object and offers instead an account of desire in terms of behaviour-cycles.;Russell attributes the theory of desire that he criticizes to common sense. I deal with the way common sense refers to desire both to evaluate Russell's criticisms and to assess the adequacy of his own theory. Russell maintains that his method for studying desire is behaviouristic. However, his theory of desire is not entirely behaviouristic because he allows introspection to play an important role in identifying feelings and sensations in human beings. Although Russell's account of desire in animals is mainly behaviouristic, his account of desire in human beings is not so because it requires beliefs which cannot be accounted for adequately on behaviouristic grounds. Russell's views of behaviourism and introspection are examined in detail and the effects of introducing beliefs to human desire are discussed at length with respect to both his theory of desire and his doctrine of neutral monism.;Russell offers a model of desire that is simplistic and incomplete. It is neither behaviouristic nor empiricistic, but it is offered to accord with his doctrine of neutral monism. I argue that this model is adequate for explaining animal and simple human desires, but needs considerable elaboration to successfully account for complicated human conscious desires.;This theory has been criticized on various grounds: that it is circular and incoherent, that it applies only to needs, and that it is too behaviouristic. I argue that these criticisms are incorrect and that Russell's critics have ignored his doctrine of neutral monism. I study Russell's modified version of neutral monism to reveal the philosophical underpinnings of his theory of desire. Brentano's and Meinong's views of mind are studied partly to show Russell's reasons for rejecting them in favour of neutral monism and partly to discuss Meinong's analysis of mental phenomena after which Russell models his analysis of belief.