Positivistic philosophy and the foundations of atonal music theory

The dogmatic empiricism of early analytic philosophy and logical positivism (as espoused by Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and the members of the Vienna Circle) had a profound impact on music theory, as can be seen in the work of Babbitt and Forte among others. The implied rejection of metaphysics, the idealization of the 'scientific' model, and the use of logical and mathematical approaches reveal the affinities shared by positivism and atonal theory.;My reading of philosophical positivism reveals that the transference of logical-linguistic principles to the realm of music theory is a more problematic endeavor than might be assumed by many theorists. This study considers some of these difficulties by focusing on the philosophical basis of positivistic tenets and evaluating their usefulness in the analysis of music. I argue, for example, that there is a difficulty in considering the intrinsic relationship between logic and universals as opposed to particulars in a musical context. Any analysis that attempts to incorporate the tools of logic may by default need to ignore the specific elements found within a given musical composition, and, as a result, fail to provide insight into the work. Theoretically, logic may illuminate some general characteristics of atonal or serial music, but analytically, it may be incapable of addressing unique traits of the individual composition.;Atonal analyses tend to discount the role of the interpretant as well as most general aesthetic considerations. It is argued here that the positivistic approach, though no doubt capable of providing insight at some level, is an unsatisfactory analytical system unless it acknowledges the dynamic relationship between art works and their perceivers.