Japanese and Philippine-American logistics: The Philippine dilemma, 1935-1942

The Philippine dilemma in the 1930s concerned more than just logistics; it concerned the formation of a new nation state. The defense policies of the United States did not meet the needs of the emerging Philippine state and until General Douglas MacArthur instituted a Philippine defense policy, the Islands were not considered defendable by American planners. The Philippine Army created by the Philippine Commonwealth between 1935-1942 provided a means of defense for the Philippines, yet in the end, that defense failed. Its failure related directly to logistical weaknesses that existed both before the war and after the war started. The invading Japanese also had logistical weaknesses but they succeeded due more to the Allied weaknesses than to Japan's own logistical skills. Rather than examine the broad policy statements of American and Philippine leaders, this study examines the details of logistical, doctrinal, organizational, and operational aspects of the creation of a Philippine Army and its baptism in combat. It also reviews the plans to defend the Islands, along with the conduct of the campaign for control of the Islands from both the Allied and Japanese sides. It determines that the Allies had the capability to defeat the Japanese in the Philippines in 1942 primarily because of the weaknesses of the Japanese. It also concludes that the American military and naval leadership lost the opportunity to hold the Philippines primarily due to its lack of a sound tactical doctrines, logistic preparations, and aggressive leadership. After the loss of the Philippines the United States chose to embark on a costly campaign of physical attrition to defeat Japan.